How long can the government
continue to Extend & Pretend? How long can public policy endlessly
'kick-the-can' down the road without addressing the underlying causes? Such a
critical point is often academically referred to as a 'Tipping Point' or what
newsletter writer John Mauldin refers to as a 'Finger of
Instability'. I am more pragmatic and as an investor, who is forced to
call the timing, I call it the Maturity Wall.
In a recent article entitled
"Sultans
of Swap: Fearing the Gearing!" I outlined the growing amount of debt
that will need to be refinanced and rolled over in the coming years. Since
releasing that analysis the amount may have reached a level where the
Maturity Wall will be too high to be scaled. That level potentially identifies
the critical requisite timing for investors to be fully aware of.
According to Morgan Stanley,
as outlined in a December article by Malcolm Maiden of the Brisbane Times,
the debt Maturity Wall looked like the following:
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
2013
|
2014
|
TOTAL
|
COMMERCIAL
REAL ESTATE
|
552
|
560
|
537
|
480
|
459
|
2.7T
|
LEVERAGED
BUY-OUT DEBT
|
71
|
113
|
203
|
294
|
406
|
|
HIGH
YIELD DEBT
|
35
|
64
|
75
|
82
|
126
|
|
TOTAL
|
657
|
737
|
815
|
856
|
992
|
4.2T
|
SOURCE: Morgan
Stanley, Fixed Income Research & Economics (1)
The Morgan Stanley, Fixed
Income Research & Economics (1) indicated at that time the US will
require $4.2 TRILLION in new financing to accommodate loans of questionable
viability, existing lending terms or loan to collateral value coming due.
HIGH YIELD DEBT
On Monday March 15th Diane Vazza, head
of global fixed-income research at Standard
& Poor's was quoted as saying "many companies whose debt matured
in 2009 and 2010 have been able to extend their loans, but the extra
breathing room is only adding to the bill for 2012 and after. That is because
the record number of bonds and loans that were issued to finance those
transactions typically come due in five to seven years"(2)
The New York Times in "Corporate
Debt Coming Due May Squeeze Credit states that the "result is a
potential financial doomsday, or what bond analysts call a Maturity Wall.
From $21 billion due this year, junk bonds are set to mature at a rate of
$155 billion in 2012, $212 billion in 2013 and $338 billion in 2014."(2)
If we compare the current
results to those reported by Morgan Stanley in Q4 2009 we are struck with the
magnitude of the problem.
The chart to the right
graphically represents the Maturity Wall associated with the High Yield debt
line item alone.
What about the recently
announced US Government debt financing needs? Also Investment grade debt?
Based on what has been reported only after a few months since Morgan Stanley
issued their report, I minimally calculate the hurdle bar to be the following
(without being able to add reliable Investment Grade debt figures for 2013
and 2014):
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
2013
|
2014
|
TOTAL
|
INVESTMENT
GRADE DEBT
|
526
|
|
|
|
|
COMMERCIAL
REAL ESTATE
|
552
|
560
|
537
|
480
|
459
|
2.7T
|
LEVERAGED
BUY-OUT DEBT
|
71
|
113
|
203
|
294
|
406
|
|
HIGH
YIELD DEBT
|
35
|
64
|
155
|
212
|
338
|
|
US
GOVERNMENT DEBT
|
1800
|
1400
|
1400
|
|
|
|
TOTAL
|
657
|
737
|
3221
|
2386
|
2604
|
9.6T
|
This table is also limited to
the USA. The obvious question is whether there is sufficient global savings
to accommodate this amount of US refinancing demand, plus the additional
demands for the rest of the world?
There is little doubt it is
going to be an Olympic record pole vault, attempted by then, a very weary,
debt challenged athlete!
US GOVERNMENT DEBT
What has surprisingly received
little media attention is that the US Government has been steadily reducing
the maturity of its treasury portfolio to keep fiscal deficits down. Whether
interest rates rise or it becomes a problem for the US Treasury to re-fund
the ever expanding roll-over pools, both suggest a Maturity Wall is dead
ahead. It will occur no later than 2012, but will likely be triggered with the
next financial default scare.
"The world does not have so much money to buy more US
Treasuries."
Zhu Min
EVERYONE HAS GONE SHORT
DURATION
The chart to the right is very
instructive in showing both the level of Interest Rate Swaps with durations
less than one year and the rate at which this duration has grown over the
last ten years for US banks.
We now have $75T in Interest
Rate and Foreign Currency Swaps in paper with less than 1 year duration held
by US Commercial banks. When interest rates begin to rise towards Morgan
Stanley's 2010 estimate of a 5.5% 10 Year US Treasury, watch out! You can
expect dramatic market actions when $75T in derivative instruments starts
re-adjusting.
INTEREST RATE SWAP
INVERSION GIVING US YET ANOTHER SIGNAL
"Historically, yields on
government bonds have traded at a discount to the derivative as swaps are
money market instruments whereas Treasuries reflect triple A sovereign risk.
Funding a swap trade over time is more expensive than Treasuries, but
constraints on balance sheets make it difficult for traders to implement such
trades. Swap rates and Treasury yields have been converging in recent weeks,
driven by high government bond supply, and increased demand by investors
using swaps for meeting long-dated liabilities rather than committing capital
to buying bonds. (7)
Here is what is keeping Morgan
Stanley up at night, and what is likely a catalyst for 10 Years to continue
creeping to MS' 5.5% target on the bond.(8)
Is the swap spread merely a
function of UNMATCHED ON - (UST) and OFF- (LIBOR) balance sheet supply?
Deficits -> Supply ->
Swap Spreads: Higher Yields
Morgan Stanley says it's about
SUPPLY, SUPPLY, SUPPLY. That is the SUPPLY of ON-Balance Sheet US Treasuries
and the lack of SUPPLY from Off-Balance Sheet (Shadow Banking - SIV) LIBOR.
"The issuance of UST debt
is dwarfing Libor-related issuance. For example, we expect UST net issuance
to be $1.7Tr and net issuance of MBS to be zero. Thus, the relative issuance
of UST's vs. Libor-based products mainly accounts for the inversion in swap
spreads. This is a first sign of stress leading to higher UST yields and
is not to be missed." (9)
BUT IT IS MORE THAN JUST A
SUPPLY / ROLLOVER PROBLEM
(as if that is not bad enough)
"To put this in context
you can look at the interest expense of The Federal Government. You will note
that despite debt going up a lot in Fiscal 2009 the interest
expense went down - a lot (about 15%.) But this year interest expense, if it
tracks the five months thus far in the books, will rise from $383 billion to
$434 billion, a 13% increase - almost erasing the "gains" from the
zero interest-rate policy.
On September 30th 2009 the
outstanding debt was $11.909 trillion dollars. That is an average
interest coupon across the entire float of the public debt of 3.22%.
Now consider what happens if short
rates go back to the 5% range - a historical reasonable point, and long rates
go into the 7% range (a point that this chart's inverted head-and-shoulders,
by the way, says is likely within the next two years):
Assuming Treasury continues to
try to shove toward the short end of the curve, a strategy that exposes it to
extreme amounts of rollover risk, the average coupon would likely rise to
about 5.5%.
This would drive interest
expense to $780 billion by September 2011.
Note that if historical
averages hold, Treasury would take in roughly $1.2 trillion in personal
income taxes. Interest expense would rise to consume approximately 2/3rds
of that amount.
Let's further
consider that interest expense would be about 80% of the entire
budget deficit of fiscal 2011." (4)
ROADMAP
With $492 Trillion outstanding
in the notional value of global Interest Rate Swaps it is reasonable to
conclude that, since one party on either side of these counterparty trades
WILL GET HURT when rates rise, there is going to be a lot of hurting in a
total global economy of only $45 Trillion.
All indications are that by
2012 the global economy is going to run headlong into a funding wall.
Markets always anticipate
events at least 6 months in advance. This wall is so huge I doubt the market
will wait and likely will begin adjusting 12- 14 months ahead!
All bets are off if we get
another sovereign or possible US State surprise. This would move our Maturity
Wall even 'closer in'.
Caveat Emptor
The last Extend & Pretend
article: EXTEND &
PRETEND - An Accounting Driven Market Recovery
SOURCES;
(1) 12-16-09 Wall
of debt a barrier to US recovery - The Brisbane Times, Malcolm Maiden
(2) 03-15-10 Corporate
Debt Coming Due May Squeeze Credit New York Times - Nelson Schwartz
(3) 03-04-10 Corporate
Debt Coming Due May Squeeze Credit Gordon T Long
(4) 03- 27-10 Deficits
And Debt-Financed Government The Market Ticker Karl Denninger
(5) 03-31-10 Are
There Signs From The Bond And Swap Spread Markets That Government Debt Risks
Will Derail The Expansion? - Zero Hedge
(6) 03-27-10 What
does the Greek Debt Crisis Mean for you? John Mauldin
(7) 03-23-10 Swap
rate falls below 10-year Treasury yield Financial Times
(8) 03-29-10 Strategic
Outlook: Greece, Negative Swap Spreads, Near-Term Caution In Europe, MBS
Spreads And More Zero Hedge
(9) 03-27-10 More
Than Meets The Bottom Line: Are Banks Getting Crushed Due To Negative Swap
Spreads And The $154 Trillion IR-
Derivative Market? - Zero Hedge
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