[This lecture was given by the Swiss-French thinker Benjamin Constant in
1819. The French title is "De la Liberté des Anciens Comparée à celle
des Modernes."]
Introduction by Ralph Raico
"He loved liberty as other men love power," was the judgment
passed on Benjamin Constant by a 19th-century admirer.
His great public concern, all throughout his adult life, was the
attainment of a free society, especially for his adopted country, France; and
if a (by no means uncritical) French commentator exaggerated in calling him
the inventor of liberalism,[1] it is nevertheless true that in the second and third
decades of the 19th century, when liberalism was the specter haunting Europe,
Constant shared with Jeremy Bentham the honor of being the chief theoretical
champion of the creed.
His influence — particularly because his involvement in French politics
under the Restoration regime gave him a platform in the most attentively
watched legislature on the Continent — was widespread; he had important
groups of followers in France, Italy and south Germany, and disciples as far
away as Russia.[2]
The comparison of Constant with Bentham is one worth making in detail,
although this will not be attempted here. While each can be taken as
representative of one of the great streams of early 19th century liberal
thought, their differences were almost as significant as their similarities.
Bentham (and his disciples) refined the rationalist and utilitarian position
of most of 18th-century French liberalism; Constant, on the other hand,
occupied himself with breaking through this mold, and attaching liberalism to
the romantic and historicist thought emerging into prominence in his day,
especially in Germany. Associated with this is his effort, which was to be
repeated in differing forms by Tocqueville and Acton, to end the
centuries-old hostility between Christianity and liberal thought, and to turn
religious faith to the advantage of the free society, now confronting new and
peculiarly dangerous enemies.
For 19th-century liberalism, the question of the nature of the political
organization of classical antiquity had at least two important aspects. In
the first place, the Jacobin and Napoleonic periods, by their free use of the
rhetoric and of some of the outward political forms of antiquity, had
suggested that classical republicanism might be connected with anti-liberal
movements. In the second place, for any liberal exploring the connection
between freedom and Christianity, the thought and practice of ancient
politics becomes immediately relevant, as representing the state of affairs
in the Western world before the introduction of Christianity.
As a recent historian of the intellectual background of Jacobinism has
said: "The strongest influence on the fathers of totalitarian democracy
was that of antiquity, interpreted in their own way."[3] What was of particular concern to
the post-Revolutionary liberal was that many had accepted the incessant
protestations of love of liberty on the part of the Leaders of the Mountain
at face value;[4]
this in turn had led to a rejection of liberty by all those who were
disgusted by the course of French political developments after about 1792.
Many persons were tempted to conclude that the tyrannical acts of Jacobins
and other revolutionary groups were somehow connected with an
"excess" of liberty, and resolved that in the future Jacobin
tyranny would be avoided by a ruthless suppression of all liberal demands.
Thus the question of the true meaning of ancient liberty was of direct
political consequence in Constant's own time.
On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns
Gentlemen,
I wish to submit for your attention a few distinctions, still rather new,
between two kinds of liberty: these differences have thus far remained
unnoticed, or at least insufficiently remarked. The first is the liberty the
exercise of which was so dear to the ancient peoples; the second the one the
enjoyment of which is especially precious to the modern nations. If I am
right, this investigation will prove interesting from two different angles.
Firstly, the confusion of these two kinds of liberty has been amongst us,
in the all too famous days of our revolution, the cause of many an evil.
France was exhausted by useless experiments, the authors of which, irritated
by their poor success, sought to force her to enjoy the good she did not
want, and denied her the good that she did want. Secondly, called as we are
by our happy revolution (I call it happy, despite its excesses, because I
concentrate my attention on its results) to enjoy the benefits of
representative government, it is curious and interesting to discover why this
form of government, the only one in the shelter of which we could find some
freedom and peace today, was totally unknown to the free nations of
antiquity.
I know that there are writers who have claimed to distinguish traces of it
among some ancient peoples, in the Lacedaemonian republic for
example, or amongst our ancestors the Gauls; but they are mistaken. The
Lacedaemonian government was a monastic aristocracy, and in no way a
representative government. The power of the kings was limited, but it was
limited by the ephors, and
not by men invested with a mission similar to that which election confers
today on the defenders of our liberties. The ephors, no doubt, though
originally created by the kings, were elected by the people. But there were
only five of them. Their authority was as much religious as political; they
even shared in the administration of government, that is, in the executive
power. Thus their prerogative, like that of almost all popular magistrates in
the ancient republics, far from being simply a barrier against tyranny became
sometimes itself an insufferable tyranny.
The regime of the Gauls,
which quite resembled the one that a certain party would like to restore to
us, was at the same time theocratic and warlike. The priests enjoyed
unlimited power. The military class or nobility had markedly insolent and
oppressive privileges; the people had no rights and no safeguards.
In Rome the tribunes had, up to a point, a representative mission. They
were the organs of those plebeians whom the oligarchy — which is the same in
all ages — had submitted, in overthrowing the kings, to so harsh a slavery.
The people, however, exercised a large part of the political rights directly.
They met to vote on the laws and to judge the patricians against whom charges
had been leveled: thus there were, in Rome, only feeble traces of a
representative system.
This system is a discovery of the moderns, and you will see, gentlemen,
that the condition of the human race in antiquity did not allow for the
introduction or establishment of an institution of this nature. The ancient
peoples could neither feel the need for it, nor appreciate its advantages.
Their social organization led them to desire an entirely different freedom
from the one this system grants to us. Tonight's lecture will be devoted to
demonstrating this truth to you.
First ask yourselves, gentlemen, what an Englishman, a Frenchman, and a
citizen of the United States of America understand today by the word
"liberty."
For each of them it is the right to be subjected only to the laws, and to
be neither arrested, detained, put to death, or maltreated in any way by the
arbitrary will of one or more individuals. It is the right of everyone to
express his opinion, choose a profession and practice it, to dispose of
property, and even to abuse it; to come and go without permission, and
without having to account for his motives or undertakings. It is everyone's
right to associate with other individuals, either to discuss their interests,
or to profess the religion that he and his associates prefer, or even simply
to occupy their days or hours in a way that is most compatible with his
inclinations or whims. Finally it is everyone's right to exercise some influence
on the administration of the government, either by electing all or particular
officials, or through representations, petitions, demands to which the
authorities are more or less compelled to pay heed. Now compare this liberty
with that of the ancients.
The latter consisted in exercising collectively, but directly, several
parts of the complete sovereignty; in deliberating, in the public square,
over war and peace; in forming alliances with foreign governments; in voting
laws, in pronouncing judgments; in examining the accounts, the acts, the
stewardship of the magistrates; in calling them to appear in front of the
assembled people, in accusing, condemning or absolving them. But if this was
what the ancients called liberty, they admitted as compatible with this
collective freedom the complete subjection of the individual to the authority
of the community. You find among them almost none of the enjoyments we have
just seen form part of the liberty of the moderns. All private actions were
submitted to a severe surveillance. No importance was given to individual
independence, neither in relation to opinions, nor to labor, nor, above all,
to religion. The right to choose one's own religious affiliation, a right
that we regard as one of the most precious, would have seemed to the ancients
a crime and a sacrilege.
In the domains that seem to us the most useful, the authority of the
social body interposed itself and obstructed the will of individuals. Among
the Spartans, Therpandrus could not add a string to his lyre without causing
offense to the ephors. In the most domestic of relations the public authority
again intervened. The young Lacedaemonian could not visit his new bride
freely. In Rome, the censors cast a searching eye over family life. The laws
regulated customs, and as customs touch on everything, there was hardly
anything that the laws did not regulate.
Thus among the ancients the individual, almost always sovereign in public
affairs, was a slave in all his private relations. As a citizen, he decided
on peace and war; as a private individual, he was constrained, watched and
repressed in all his movements; as a member of the collective body, he
interrogated, dismissed, condemned, beggared, exiled, or sentenced to death
his magistrates and superiors; as a subject of the collective body he could
himself be deprived of his status, stripped of his privileges, banished, put
to death, by the discretionary will of the whole to which he belonged.
Among the moderns, on the contrary, the individual, independent in his
private life, is, even in the freest of states, sovereign only in appearance.
His sovereignty is restricted and almost always suspended. If, at fixed and
rare intervals, in which he is again surrounded by precautions and obstacles,
he exercises this sovereignty, it is always only to renounce it.
I must at this point, gentlemen, pause for a moment to anticipate an
objection that may be addressed to me. There was in antiquity a republic
where the enslavement of individual existence to the collective body was not
as complete as I have described it. This republic was the most famous of all:
you will guess that I am speaking of Athens. I shall return to it later, and
in subscribing to the truth of this fact, I shall also indicate its cause. We
shall see why, of all the ancient states, Athens was the one that most
resembles the modern ones. Everywhere else social jurisdiction was unlimited.
The ancients, as Condorcet
says, had no notion of individual rights. Men were, so to speak, merely
machines, whose gears and cog-wheels were regulated by the law. The same
subjection characterized the golden centuries of the Roman Republic; the
individual was in some way lost in the nation, the citizen in the city. We
shall now trace this essential difference between the ancients and ourselves
back to its source.
All ancient republics were restricted to a narrow territory. The most
populous, the most powerful, the most substantial among them, was not equal
in extension to the smallest of modern states. As an inevitable consequence
of their narrow territory, the spirit of these republics was bellicose; each
people incessantly attacked their neighbors or was attacked by them. Thus
driven by necessity against one another, they fought or threatened each other
constantly. Those who had no ambition to be conquerors, could still not lay
down their weapons, lest they should themselves be conquered. All had to buy
their security, their independence, their whole existence at the price of
war. This was the constant interest, the almost habitual occupation of the
free states of antiquity. Finally, by an equally necessary result of this way
of being, all these states had slaves. The mechanical professions and even,
among some nations, the industrial ones, were committed to people in chains.
The modern world offers us a completely opposing view. The smallest states
of our day are incomparably larger than Sparta or than Rome was over five
centuries. Even the division of Europe into several states is, thanks to the
progress of enlightenment, more apparent than real. While each people, in the
past, formed an isolated family, the born enemy of other families, a mass of
human beings now exists, that under different names and under different forms
of social organization are essentially homogeneous in their nature. This mass
is strong enough to have nothing to fear from barbarian hordes. It is
sufficiently civilized to find war a burden. Its uniform tendency is towards
peace.
This difference leads to another one. War precedes commerce. War and
commerce are only two different means of achieving the same end, that of
getting what one wants. Commerce is simply a tribute paid to the strength of
the possessor by the aspirant to possession. It is an attempt to conquer, by
mutual agreement, what one can no longer hope to obtain through violence. A
man who was always the stronger would never conceive the idea of commerce. It
is experience, by proving to him that war, that is the use of his strength
against the strength of others, exposes him to a variety of obstacles and
defeats, that leads him to resort to commerce, that is to a milder and surer
means of engaging the interest of others to agree to what suits his own. War
is all impulse, commerce, calculation. Hence it follows that an age must come
in which commerce replaces war. We have reached this age.
I do not mean that amongst the ancients there were no trading peoples. But
these peoples were to some degree an exception to the general rule. The
limits of this lecture do not allow me to illustrate all the obstacles that
then opposed the progress of commerce; you know them as well as I do; I shall
only mention one of them.
Their ignorance of the compass meant that the sailors of antiquity always
had to keep close to the coast. To pass through the pillars of Hercules, that
is, the straits of Gibraltar, was considered the most daring of enterprises.
The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians, the most able of navigators, did not
risk it until very late, and their example for long remained without
imitators. In Athens, of which we shall talk soon, the interest on maritime
enterprises was around 60%, while current interest was only 12%: that was how
dangerous the idea of distant navigation seemed.
Moreover, if I could permit myself a digression that would unfortunately
prove too long, I would show you, gentlemen, through the details of the
customs, habits, way of trading with others of the trading peoples of
antiquity, that their commerce was itself impregnated by the spirit of the
age, by the atmosphere of war and hostility that surrounded it. Commerce then
was a lucky accident, today it is the normal state of things, the only aim,
the universal tendency, the true life of nations. They want repose, and with
repose comfort, and as a source of comfort, industry. Every day war becomes a
more ineffective means of satisfying their wishes. Its hazards no longer
offer to individuals benefits that match the results of peaceful work and
regular exchanges.
Among the ancients, a successful war increased both private and public
wealth in slaves, tributes and lands shared out. For the moderns, even a
successful war costs infallibly more than it is worth. Finally, thanks to
commerce, to religion, to the moral and intellectual progress of the human
race, there are no longer slaves among the European nations. Free men must
exercise all professions, provide for all the needs of society.
It is easy to see, gentlemen, the inevitable outcome of these differences.
Firstly, the size of a country causes a corresponding decrease of the
political importance allotted to each individual. The most obscure republican
of Sparta or Rome had power. The same is not true of the simple citizen of
Britain or of the United States. His personal influence is an imperceptible
part of the social will that impresses on the government its direction.
Secondly, the abolition of slavery has deprived the free population of all
the leisure that resulted from the fact that slaves took care of most of the
work. Without the slave population of Athens, 20,000 Athenians could never
have spent every day at the public square in discussions. Thirdly, commerce
does not, like war, leave in men's lives intervals of inactivity. The
constant exercise of political rights, the daily discussion of the affairs of
the state, disagreements, confabulations, the whole entourage and movement of
factions, necessary agitations, the compulsory filling, if I may use the
term, of the life of the peoples of antiquity, who, without this resource
would have languished under the weight of painful inaction, would only cause
trouble and fatigue to modern nations, where each individual, occupied with
his speculations, his enterprises, the pleasures he obtains or hopes for,
does not wish to be distracted from them other than momentarily, and as
little as possible.
Finally, commerce inspires in men a vivid love of individual independence.
Commerce supplies their needs, satisfies their desires, without the
intervention of the authorities. This intervention is almost always — and I
do not know why I say almost — this intervention is indeed always a trouble
and an embarrassment. Every time collective power wishes to meddle with
private speculations, it harasses the speculators. Every time governments
pretend to do our own business, they do it more incompetently and expensively
than we would.
I said, gentlemen, that I would return to Athens, whose example might be
opposed to some of my assertions, but will in fact confirm all of them.
Athens, as I have already pointed out, was of all the Greek republics the
most closely engaged in trade, thus it allowed to its citizens an infinitely
greater individual liberty than Sparta or Rome.
If I could enter into historical details, I would show you that, among the
Athenians, commerce had removed several of the differences that distinguished
the ancient from the modern peoples. The spirit of the Athenian merchants was
similar to that of the merchants of our days. Xenophon tells us that
during the Peloponnesian war, they moved their capitals from the continent of
Attica to place them on the islands of the archipelago. Commerce had created
among them the circulation of money.
In Isocrates there
are signs that bills of exchange were used. Observe how their customs
resemble our own. In their relations with women, you will see, again I cite
Xenophon, husbands, satisfied when peace and a decorous friendship reigned in
their households, make allowances for the wife who is too vulnerable before
the tyranny of nature, close their eyes to the irresistible power of
passions, forgive the first weakness and forget the second. In their
relations with strangers, we shall see them extending the rights of
citizenship to whoever would, by moving among them with his family, establish
some trade or industry.
Finally, we shall be struck by their excessive love of individual
independence. In Sparta, says a philosopher, the citizens quicken their step
when they are called by a magistrate; but an Athenian would be desperate if
he were thought to be dependent on a magistrate. However, as several of the
other circumstances that determined the character of ancient nations existed
in Athens as well; as there was a slave population and the territory was very
restricted; we find there too the traces of the liberty proper to the
ancients. The people made the laws, examined the behavior of the magistrates,
called Pericles to account for his conduct, sentenced to death the generals
who had commanded the battle of the
Arginusae. Similarly ostracism, that legal arbitrariness, extolled by all
the legislators of the age; ostracism, which appears to us, and rightly so, a
revolting iniquity, proves that the individual was much more subservient to
the supremacy of the social body in Athens, than he is in any of the free
states of Europe today.
It follows from what I have just indicated that we can no longer enjoy the
liberty of the ancients, which consisted in an active and constant
participation in collective power. Our freedom must consist of peaceful
enjoyment and private independence. The share that in antiquity everyone held
in national sovereignty was by no means an abstract presumption as it is in
our own day. The will of each individual had real influence: the exercise of
this will was a vivid and repeated pleasure. Consequently the ancients were
ready to make many a sacrifice to preserve their political rights and their
share in the administration of the state. Everybody, feeling with pride all
that his suffrage was worth, found in this awareness of his personal
importance a great compensation.
This compensation no longer exists for us today. Lost in the multitude,
the individual can almost never perceive the influence he exercises. Never
does his will impress itself upon the whole; nothing confirms in his eyes his
own cooperation. The exercise of political rights, therefore, offers us but a
part of the pleasures that the ancients found in it, while at the same time
the progress of civilization, the commercial tendency of the age, the
communication amongst peoples, have infinitely multiplied and varied the
means of personal happiness.
It follows that we must be far more attached than the ancients to our
individual independence. For the ancients when they sacrificed that
independence to their political rights, sacrificed less to obtain more; while
in making the same sacrifice! we would give more to obtain less. The aim of
the ancients was the sharing of social power among the citizens of the same
fatherland: this is what they called liberty. The aim of the moderns is the
enjoyment of security in private pleasures; and they call liberty the
guarantees accorded by institutions to these pleasures .
I said at the beginning that, through their failure to perceive these
differences, otherwise well-intentioned men caused infinite evils during our
long and stormy revolution. God forbid that I should reproach them too
harshly. Their error itself was excusable. One could not read the beautiful
pages of antiquity — one could not recall the actions of its great men —
without feeling an indefinable and special emotion, which nothing modern can
possibly arouse. The old elements of a nature, one could almost say, earlier
than our own, seem to awaken in us in the face of these memories.
It is difficult not to regret the time when the faculties of man developed
along an already trodden path, but in so wide a career, so strong in their
own powers, with such a feeling of energy and dignity. Once we abandon
ourselves to this regret, it is impossible not to wish to imitate what we
regret. This impression was very deep, especially when we lived under vicious
governments, which, without being strong, were repressive in their effects;
absurd in their principles; wretched in action; governments that had as their
strength arbitrary power; for their purpose the belittling of mankind; and
which some individuals still dare to praise to us today, as if we could ever
forget that we have been the witnesses and the victims of their obstinacy, of
their impotence and of their overthrow.
The aim of our reformers was noble and generous. Who among us did not feel
his heart beat with hope at the outset of the course they seemed to open up?
And shame, even today, on whoever does not feel the need to declare that
acknowledging a few errors committed by our first guides does not mean
blighting their memory or disowning the opinions the friends of mankind have
professed throughout the ages.
But those men had derived several of their theories from the works of two
philosophers who had themselves failed to recognize the changes brought by
two thousand years in the dispositions of mankind. I shall perhaps at some
point examine the system of the most illustrious of these philosophers, of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and I shall show that, by transposing into our modern
age an extent of social power, of collective sovereignty, which belonged to other
centuries, this sublime genius, animated by the purest love of liberty, has
nevertheless furnished deadly pretexts for more than one kind of tyranny.
No doubt, in pointing out what I regard as a misunderstanding that it is
important to uncover, I shall be careful in my refutation, and respectful in
my criticism. I shall certainly refrain from joining myself to the detractors
of a great man. When chance has it that I find myself apparently in agreement
with them on some one particular point, I suspect myself; and to console
myself for appearing for a moment in agreement with them on a single partial
question, I need to disown and denounce with all my energies these pretended
allies.
Nevertheless, the interests of truth must prevail over considerations that
make the glory of a prodigious talent and the authority of an immense
reputation so powerful. Moreover, as we shall see, it is not to Rousseau that
we must chiefly attribute the error against which I am going to argue; this
is to be imputed much more to one of his successors, less eloquent but no
less austere and a hundred times more exaggerated. The latter, the Abbé de Mably,
can be regarded as the representative of the system that, according to the
maxims of ancient liberty, demands that the citizens should be entirely
subjected in order for the nation to be sovereign, and that the individual
should be enslaved for the people to be free.
The Abbé de Mably, like Rousseau and many others, had mistaken, just as
the ancients did, the authority of the social body for liberty; and to him
any means seemed good if it extended his area of authority over that
recalcitrant part of human existence whose independence he deplored. The
regret he expresses everywhere in his works is that the law can only cover
actions. He would have liked it to cover the most fleeting thoughts and
impressions; to pursue man relentlessly, leaving him no refuge in which he
might escape from its power. No sooner did he learn, among no matter what
people, of some oppressive measure, than he thought he had made a discovery
and proposed it as a model. He detested individual liberty like a personal
enemy; and whenever in history he came across a nation totally deprived of
it, even if it had no political liberty, he could not help admiring it. He
went into ecstasies over the Egyptians, because, as he said, among them
everything was prescribed by the law, down to relaxations and needs:
everything was subjected to the empire of the legislator. Every moment of the
day was filled by some duty; love itself was the object of this respected
intervention, and it was the law that in turn opened and closed the curtains
of the nuptial bed.
Sparta, which combined republican forms with the same enslavement of
individuals, aroused in the spirit of that philosopher an even more vivid
enthusiasm. That vast monastic barracks to him seemed the ideal of a perfect
republic. He had a profound contempt for Athens, and would gladly have said
of this nation, the first of Greece, what an academician and great nobleman
said of the French Academy: What an appalling despotism! Everyone does what
he likes there. I must add that this great nobleman was talking of the
Academy as it was thirty years ago.
Montesquieu,
who had a less excitable and therefore more observant mind, did not fall into
quite the same errors. He was struck by the differences I have related; but
he did not discover their true cause. The Greek politicians who lived under
the popular government did not recognize, he argues, any other power but
virtue. Politicians of today talk only of manufactures, of commerce, of
finances, of wealth and even of luxury. He attributes this difference to the
republic and the monarchy. It ought instead to be attributed to the opposed
spirit of ancient and modern times. Citizens of republics, subjects of
monarchies, all want pleasures, and indeed no one, in the present condition
of societies can help wanting them. The people most attached to their liberty
in our own days, before the emancipation of France, was also the most
attached to all the pleasures of life; and it valued its liberty especially
because it saw in this the guarantee of the pleasures it cherished. In the
past, where there was liberty, people could bear hardship. Now, wherever
there is hardship, despotism is necessary for people to resign themselves to
it. It would be easier today to make Spartans of an enslaved people than to
turn free men into Spartans.
The men who were brought by events to the head of our revolution were, by
a necessary consequence of the education they had received, steeped in
ancient views that are no longer valid, which the philosophers whom I
mentioned above had made fashionable. The metaphysics of Rousseau, in the
midst of which flashed the occasional sublime thought and passages of
stirring eloquence; the austerity of Mably, his intolerance, his hatred of
all human passions, his eagerness to enslave them all, his exaggerated
principles on the competence of the law, the difference between what he
recommended and what had ever previously existed, his declamations against
wealth and even against property; all these things were bound to charm men
heated by their recent victory, and who, having won power over the law, were
only too keen to extend this power to all things.
It was a source of invaluable support that two disinterested writers anathematizing
human despotism, should have drawn up the text of the law in axioms. They
wished to exercise public power as they had learnt from their guides it had
once been exercised in the free states. They believed that everything should
give way before collective will, and that all restrictions on individual
rights would be amply compensated by participation in social power.
We all know, gentlemen, what has come of it. Free institutions, resting
upon the knowledge of the spirit of the age, could have survived. The
restored edifice of the ancients collapsed, notwithstanding many efforts and
many heroic acts that call for our admiration. The fact is that social power
injured individual independence in every possible war, without destroying the
need for it. The nation did not find that an ideal share in an abstract
sovereignty was worth the sacrifices required from her. She was vainly
assured, on Rousseau's authority, that the laws of liberty are a thousand
times more austere than the yoke of tyrants. She had no desire for those
austere laws, and believed sometimes that the yoke of tyrants would be
preferable to them. Experience has come to undeceive her. She has seen that
the arbitrary power of men was even worse than the worst of laws. But laws
too must have their limits.
If I have succeeded, gentlemen, in making you share the persuasion that in
my opinion these facts must produce, you will acknowledge with me the truth
of the following principles. Individual independence is the first need of the
moderns: consequently one must never require from them any sacrifices to
establish political liberty. It follows that none of the numerous and too
highly praised institutions that in the ancient republics hindered individual
liberty is any longer admissible in the modern times.
You may, in the first place, think, gentlemen, that it is superfluous to
establish this truth. Several governments of our days do not seem in the
least inclined to imitate the republics of antiquity. However, little as they
may like republican institutions, there are certain republican usages for
which they feel a certain affection. It is disturbing that they should be
precisely those that allow them to banish, to exile, or to despoil.
I remember that in 1802, they slipped into the law on special tribunals an
article that introduced into France Greek ostracism; and God knows how many
eloquent speakers, in order to have this article approved, talked to us about
the freedom of Athens and all the sacrifices that individuals must make to
preserve this freedom! Similarly, in much more recent times, when fearful
authorities attempted, with a timid hand, to rig the elections, a journal
that can hardly be suspected of republicanism proposed to revive Roman
censorship to eliminate all dangerous candidates.
I do not think therefore that I am engaging in a useless discussion if, to
support my assertion, I say a few words about these two much vaunted
institutions. Ostracism in Athens rested upon the assumption that society had
complete authority over its members. On this assumption it could be
justified; and in a small state, where the influence of a single individual,
strong in his credit, his clients, his glory, often balanced the power of the
mass, ostracism may appear useful. But amongst us individuals have rights
that society must respect, and individual interests are, as I have already
observed, so lost in a multitude of equal or superior influences, that any
oppression motivated by the need to diminish this influence is useless and
consequently unjust.
No one has the right to exile a citizen, if he is not condemned by a
regular tribunal, according to a formal law that attaches the penalty of
exile to the action of which he is guilty. No one has the right to tear the
citizen from his country, the owner away from his possessions, the merchant
away from his trade, the husband from his wife, the father from his children,
the writer from his studious meditations, the old man from his accustomed way
of life. All political exile is a political abuse. All exile pronounced by an
assembly for alleged reasons of public safety is a crime that the assembly
itself commits against public safety, which resides only in respect for the
laws, in the observance of forms, and in the maintenance of safeguards.
Roman censorship implied, like ostracism, a discretionary power. In a
republic where all the citizens, kept by poverty to an extremely simple moral
code, lived in the same town, exercised no profession that might distract
their attention from the affairs of the state, and thus constantly found
themselves the spectators and judges of the usage of public power, censorship
could on the one hand have greater influence: while on the other, the
arbitrary power of the censors was restrained by a kind of moral surveillance
exercised over them. But as soon as the size of the republic, the complexity
of social relations and the refinements of civilization deprived this
institution of what at the same time served as its basis and its limit,
censorship degenerated even in Rome. It was not censorship that had created
good morals; it was the simplicity of those morals that constituted the power
and efficacy of censorship.
In France, an institution as arbitrary as censorship would be at once
ineffective and intolerable. In the present conditions of society, morals are
formed by subtle, fluctuating, elusive nuances, which would be distorted in a
thousand ways if one attempted to define them more precisely. Public opinion
alone can reach them; public opinion alone can judge them, because it is of
the same nature. It would rebel against any positive authority that wanted to
give it greater precision. If the government of a modern people wanted, like
the censors in Rome, to censure a citizen arbitrarily, the entire nation
would protest against this arrest by refusing to ratify the decisions of the
authority.
What I have just said of the revival of censorship in modern times applies
also to many other aspects of social organization, in relation to which
antiquity is cited even more frequently and with greater emphasis. As for
example, education; what do we not hear of the need to allow the government
to take possession of new generations to shape them to its pleasure, and how
many erudite quotations are employed to support this theory!
The Persians, the Egyptians, Gaul, Greece and Italy are one after another
set before us. Yet, gentlemen, we are neither Persians subjected to a despot,
nor Egyptians subjugated by priests, nor Gauls who can be sacrificed by their
druids, nor, finally, Greeks or Romans, whose share in social authority
consoled them for their private enslavement.
We are modern men, who wish each to enjoy our own rights, each to develop
our own faculties as we like best, without harming anyone; to watch over the
development of these faculties in the children whom nature entrusts to our
affection, the more enlightened as it is more vivid; and needing the
authorities only to give us the general means of instruction they can supply,
as travelers accept from them the main roads without being told by them which
route to take.
Religion is also exposed to these memories of bygone ages. Some brave
defenders of the unity of doctrine cite the laws of the ancients against
foreign gods, and sustain the rights of the Catholic church by the example of
the Athenians, who killed Socrates for having undermined polytheism, and that
of Augustus, who wanted the people to remain faithful to the cult of their
fathers; with the result, shortly afterwards, that the first Christians were
delivered to the lions.
Let us mistrust, gentlemen, this admiration for certain ancient memories.
Since we live in modern times, I want a liberty suited to modern times; and
since we live under monarchies, I humbly beg these monarchies not to borrow
from the ancient republics the means to oppress us.
Individual liberty, I repeat, is the true modern liberty. Political
liberty is its guarantee, consequently political liberty is indispensable.
But to ask the peoples of our day to sacrifice, like those of the past, the
whole of their individual liberty to political liberty, is the surest means
of detaching them from the former and, once this result has been achieved, it
would be only too easy to deprive them of the latter.
As you see, gentlemen, my observations do not in the least tend to
diminish the value of political liberty. I do not draw from the evidence I
have put before your eyes the same conclusions that some others have. From
the fact that the ancients were free, and that we cannot any longer be free
like them, they conclude that we are destined to be slaves. They would like
to reconstitute the new social state with a small number of elements that,
they say, are alone appropriate to the situation of the world today. These elements
are prejudices to frighten men, egoism to corrupt them, frivolity to stupefy
them, gross pleasures to degrade them, despotism to lead them; and,
indispensably, constructive knowledge and exact sciences to serve despotism
the more adroitly.
It would be odd indeed if this were the outcome of forty centuries during
which mankind has acquired greater moral and physical means: I cannot believe
it. I derive from the differences that distinguish us from antiquity totally
different conclusions. It is not security that we must weaken; it is
enjoyment that we must extend. It is not political liberty that I wish to
renounce; it is civil liberty that I claim, along with other forms of
political liberty. Governments have no more right at present than they did in
the past to arrogate to themselves an illegitimate power. But the governments
that emanate from a legitimate source have even less right than before to
exercise an arbitrary supremacy over individuals.
We still possess today the rights we have always had, those eternal rights
to assent to the laws, to deliberate on our interests, to be an integral part
of the social body of which we are members. But governments have new duties;
the progress of civilization, the changes brought by the centuries require
from the authorities greater respect for customs, for affections, for the
independence of individuals. They must handle all these issues with a lighter
and more prudent hand.
This reserve on the part of authority, which is one of its strictest
duties, equally represents its well-conceived interest; since, if the liberty
that suits the moderns is different from that which suited the ancients, the
despotism that was possible amongst the ancients is no longer possible
amongst the moderns. Because we are often less concerned with political
liberty than they could be, and in ordinary circumstances less passionate
about it, it may follow that we neglect, sometimes too much and always
wrongly, the guarantees that this assures us. But at the same time, as we are
much more preoccupied with individual liberty than the ancients, we shall
defend it, if it is attacked, with much more skill and persistence; and we
have means to defend it that the ancients did not.
Commerce makes the action of arbitrary power over our existence more
oppressive than in the past, because, as our speculations are more varied,
arbitrary power must multiply itself to reach them. But commerce also makes
the action of arbitrary power easier to elude, because it changes the nature
of property, which becomes, in virtue of this change, almost impossible to
seize.
Commerce confers a new quality on property, circulation. Without
circulation, property is merely a usufruct; political authority can always
affect usufruct, because it can prevent its enjoyment; but circulation
creates an invisible and invincible obstacle to the actions of social power.
The effects of commerce extend even further: not only does it emancipate
individuals, but, by creating credit, it places authority itself in a
position of dependence. Money, says a French writer, "is the most
dangerous weapon of despotism; yet it is at the same time its most powerful
restraint; credit is subject to opinion; force is useless; money hides itself
or flees; all the operations of the state are suspended."
Credit did not have the same influence amongst the ancients; their
governments were stronger than individuals, while in our time individuals are
stronger than the political powers. Wealth is a power that is more readily
available in all circumstances, more readily applicable to all interests, and
consequently more real and better obeyed. Power threatens; wealth rewards:
one eludes power by deceiving it; to obtain the favors of wealth one must
serve it: the latter is therefore bound to win.
As a result, individual existence is less absorbed in political existence.
Individuals carry their treasures far away; they take with them all the
enjoyments of private life. Commerce has brought nations closer, it has given
them customs and habits that are almost identical; the heads of states may be
enemies: the peoples are compatriots.
Let power therefore resign itself: we must have liberty and we shall have
it. But since the liberty we need is different from that of the ancients, it
needs a different organization from the one that would suit ancient liberty.
In the latter, the more time and energy man dedicated to the exercise of his
political rights, the freer he thought himself; on the other hand, in the
kind of liberty of which we are capable, the more the exercise of political
rights leaves us the time for our private interests, the more precious will
liberty be to us.
Hence, sirs, the need for the representative system. The representative
system is nothing but an organization by means of which a nation charges a
few individuals to do what it cannot or does not wish to do herself. Poor men
look after their own business; rich men hire stewards. This is the history of
ancient and modern nations. The representative system is a proxy given to a
certain number of men by the mass of the people who wish their interests to
be defended and who nevertheless do not have the time to defend them
themselves.
But, unless they are idiots, rich men who employ stewards keep a close
watch on whether these stewards are doing their duty, lest they should prove
negligent, corruptible, or incapable; and, in order to judge the management
of these proxies, the landowners, if they are prudent, keep themselves well
informed about affairs, the management of which they entrust to them.
Similarly, the people who, in order to enjoy the liberty that suits them,
resort to the representative system, must exercise an active and constant
surveillance over their representatives, and reserve for themselves, at times
that should not be separated by too lengthy intervals, the right to discard
them if they betray their trust, and to revoke the powers they might have
abused.
For from the fact that modern liberty differs from ancient liberty, it
follows that it is also threatened by a different sort of danger. The danger
of ancient liberty was that men, exclusively concerned with securing their
share of social power, might attach too little value to individual rights and
enjoyments.
The danger of modern liberty is that, absorbed in the enjoyment of our
private independence, and in the pursuit of our particular interests, we
should surrender our right to share in political power too easily. The
holders of authority are only too anxious to encourage us to do so. They are
so ready to spare us all sort of troubles, except those of obeying and
paying!
They will say to us: what, in the end, is the aim of your efforts, the
motive of your labors, the object of all your hopes? Is it not happiness?
Well, leave this happiness to us and we shall give it to you. No, sirs, we
must not leave it to them. No matter how touching such a tender commitment
may be, let us ask the authorities to keep within their limits. Let them
confine themselves to being just. We shall assume the responsibility of being
happy for ourselves.
Could we be made happy by diversions, if these diversions were without
guarantees? And where should we find guarantees, without political liberty?
To renounce it, gentlemen, would be a folly like that of a man who, because
he only lives on the first floor, does not care if the house itself is built
on sand.
Moreover, gentlemen, is it so evident that happiness, of whatever kind, is
the only aim of mankind? If it were so, our course would be narrow indeed,
and our destination far from elevated. There is not one single one of us who,
if he wished to abase himself, restrain his moral faculties, lower his
desires, abjure activity, glory, deep and generous emotions, could not demean
himself and be happy.
No, sirs, I bear witness to the better part of our nature, that noble
disquiet that pursues and torments us, that desire to broaden our knowledge
and develop our faculties. It is not to happiness alone, it is to
self-development that our destiny calls us; and political liberty is the most
powerful, the most effective means of self-development that heaven has given
us.
Political liberty, by submitting to all the citizens, without exception,
the care and assessment of their most sacred interests, enlarges their
spirit, ennobles their thoughts, and establishes among them a kind of intellectual
equality that forms the glory and power of a people.
Thus, see how a nation grows with the first institution that restores to
her the regular exercise of political liberty. See our countrymen of all
classes, of all professions, emerge from the sphere of their usual labors and
private industry, find themselves suddenly at the level of important
functions that the constitutions confers upon them, choose with discernment,
resist with energy, brave threats, nobly withstand seduction.
See a pure, deep and sincere patriotism triumph in our towns, revive even
our smallest villages, permeate our workshops, enliven our countryside,
penetrate the just and honest spirits of the useful farmer and the
industrious tradesman with a sense of our rights and the need for safeguards;
they, learned in the history of the evils they have suffered, and no less
enlightened as to the remedies these evils demand, take in with a glance the
whole of France and, bestowing a national gratitude, repay with their
suffrage, after thirty years, the fidelity to principles embodied in the most
illustrious of the defenders of liberty.
Therefore, sirs, far from renouncing either of the two sorts of freedom I
have described to you, it is necessary, as I have shown, to learn to combine the
two together. Institutions, says the famous author of the history of the
republics in the Middle Ages, must accomplish the destiny of the human race;
they can best achieve their aim if they elevate the largest possible number
of citizens to the highest moral position.
The work of the legislator is not complete when he has simply brought
peace to the people. Even when the people are satisfied, there is much left
to do. Institutions must achieve the moral education of the citizens. By
respecting their individual rights, securing their independence, refraining
from troubling their work, they must nevertheless consecrate their influence
over public affairs, call them to contribute by their votes to the exercise
of power, grant them a right of control and supervision by expressing their
opinions; and, by forming them through practice for these elevated functions,
give them both the desire and the right to discharge these.
Notes
[1] Emile Faguet, Politiques
et moralistes du XIXe siècle, 1re série (Paris: Boiven, 1891), p. 255.
[2] William
Holdheim, Benjamin Constant (New York: Hillary, 1961), p. 73.
[3] J.L. Talmon, The
Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Mercury, 1961), p. 11.
[4] The
"Leaders of the Mountain" were Maximilien Robespierre, Georges
Jacques Danton, and Jean Paul Marat. The Mountain dominated a powerful
political club called the Jacobin Club.