Gerard
Jackson
I think
it’s pretty clear that Keynesians and their votaries in the media have learnt
nothing from the last recession. Their absolute faith in the fallacy that
consumption drives economies is sufficient proof of that. Time and time again
I keep reading that consumer spending is 70 per cent or so of GDP which
means, according to them, that if consumer spending falls the economy will
slide into recession. Austrian economics has continually pointed out how
dangerously wrong this view is.
What
really matters is total spending, of which business spending is by far the
largest and most important component. The problem is that the commentariat
unthinkingly swallowed the fallacy that including spending between stages of
production would be a case of double-counting with the result that national
income figures seriously underestimate actual spending.
If the
orthodox approach was correct then eliminating spending on intermediate goods
would have no effect on production. Yet we know that if this were to occur
the economy would collapse. Fortunately some American government economists
have finally recognised the problem. Beginning this year the Bureau of
Economic Analysis started producing an additional measure of economic
activity called gross output. However, the BEA had previously made spending
estimates based on gross output. Some years ago it calculated that though GDP
for 2000 was about $13 trillion actual spending came in at about $23
trillion. Although I think this is an underestimate it nevertheless revealed
a fundamental and vitally important fact that business spending is what
really counts for the economy.
It
simply won’t do for Keynesians to argue that consumer spending drives the
economy because it is 65 or 70 per cent of GDP and then deny the same
reasoning to business spending when it is shown that the gross spending
approach reverses the situation.
We are
therefore correct in deducing that business spending is where we should first
look for danger signs of an impending recession. Now this perspective is not
unique to the Austrian school of economics. It was generally accepted before
and during the Great Depression that it is fluctuation in the ‘rate of
capital accumulation that constitute the trade cycle, something that
classical economists were completely aware of1. Chart 1 is a
graphic example of this observation.
This
brings us to the American economy. Chart 2 is from the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Lois and shows employment, gross private domestic investment (GDPI)
and consumption spending for the period 1998 to 2010. A striking point is
that consumption2 continued to rise during the 2001 recession even
though employment fell by 2 per cent and GDPI by 12.3 per cent.
The
2008 recession is particularly interesting. Despite the fact that GDPI
started to contract in January 2006 and employment didn’t start falling until
July 2007consumption didn’t begin its decline until April 2008. By the
following April consumption began to recover after falling by 2.7 per cent.
This is in stark contrast with GDPI which didn’t begin to recover until July
2009 after contracting by 35 per cent3. How any economist or
finance writer can look at these figures and still categorically state that
consumer spending is what drives the economy leaves me completely bewildered4.
I think
I earned considerable bragging rights with respect to the 2001 recession. In
1999 I warned (in The New Australian)
that the US economy was moving into recession. I emphasised the fact that
manufacturing was contracting and shedding labour, a sure sign that recession
had started. I also stressed that commentators were being deceived by the
falling unemployment rate. This this situation led to Steve Slifer,
then-chief economist for Lehman Brothers, to say of the US economy in January
2001:
It’s
really an odd-looking slowdown. The manufacturing sector is, in fact, in a
recession but not the overall economy. At least not yet.
This is
what happens when you have been infected with Keynesianitis: it forces its
victims to focus on aggregates and treat capital as homogeneous. This is why
the likes of Slifer were unable to see that the boom was nearing its final
phase. Consumer spending was quickly rising at the same time as business
spending was falling, creating an additional demand for labour at the lower
stages of production. I pointed out in numerous articles that this
consumer-led demand for labour would serve to mislead people for a time as to
what was really happening to the American economy.
I
stressed that a point would be reached where aggregate unemployment would
eventually begin to rise, even if consumer spending might still continue to
rise. And this is precisely what happened, to the surprise of many but not
members of the Austrian school of economics. The same thing happened with
respect to the 2008 recession. Industries closest to the point of consumption
hired 143,000 workers in September 2006 while in the same month manufacturing
shed 33,000 jobs.
In
January 2008 factory orders fell by fell 4.2 per cent and then by 3.3 per
cent in September. The Institute of Supply Management’s manufacturing index
fell to 52.0 in September. It was 53.8 in July, dropping to 52.9 in August, a
month that experienced a fall of 4.4 per cent in orders for capital goods.
Yet employers hired an additional 110,000 workers in September. We also find
that during that 12-month period wages rose by about 4 per cent. But this is
usual for a boom that is drawing to a close. Karl Marx, echoing the classical
economists, pointed out that
crises
are precisely always preceded by a period in which wages-rise generally and
the working class actually get a larger share of the annual product intended
for consumption5.
No wonder
Keynesians were flummoxed.
Note: New housing as well as manufacturing
is also a good economic indicator, not because housing is a durable good — so
is my television — but because it is a highly expensive good whose services
are continuously consumed for decades. It therefore has the characteristics
of a durable capital good. Nevertheless, it is still a consumer good.
* * * * *
1The
classical economists new that investment booms gave way to what they called
disproportionalities. The collapse of the railway boom and the financial
crisis of 1847 brought forth considerable and insightful commentary from Col.
Robert Torrens and James Wilson, founder of the Economist. Unfortunately, Dr. Steve
Kates has successfully persuaded a number of people that his explanation for
the trade cycle is based on classical thinking. This is completely wrong. His
opinions on the subject are completely at variance with what can be called
the classical theory of the trade cycle.
2Housing
is not generally included in consumption figures because it is considered an
investment good. Housing should be defined as a highly durable consumer good.
The difference between a capital good and a consumer good is that the former
serves consumers indirectly while the latter’s services are consumed
directly. In other words, a good is defined by its role in the capital
structure. However, some Austrians, on account of durability, insist on
calling houses capital goods.
3The
GPDI does not include spending on intermediate goods. If total business spending
had been used the drop in investment spending would have been far greater.
4Some
economic commentators latched on to the view that the financial crisis was
caused by the destabilising effect of a global savings glut. The idea of
excess savings goes back at least to Jeremy Bentham. Using Say’s Law James
Stuart Mill successfully explained to Bentham why the concept of surplus
capital (which what excess savings amount to) was fallacious. Unfortunately,
the idea was resurrected in 1829 by Edward Gibbon Wakefield who published his
Letter from Sydney.
(Actually it was from an English prison where he was being held for abducting
a young heiress). Part of Wakefield’s thesis was that the colonies were
needed to absorb England’s surplus capital. The idea was picked up again by
J. A. Hobson and later adopted by Lenin.
What
our highly paid financial commentators were unable to fathom, and still
can’t, is that this so-called savings glut was nothing but excess credit
created by the central banks. Once again the economic commentariat displayed
an appalling ignorance of the history of economic thought.
5Karl
Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political
Economy, London: Swan Sonnenchein & Co., 1910, p. 476.
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