“The Middle East will blow up – the only question is when”
In this exclusive interview, the renowned economist and energy expert
Hossein Askari reflects on some crucial topics of our time, inter alia:
current developments in the energy business; the high oil price and the main
drivers of it; the Iranian conflict and other challenges in the Middle East;
China as the rising energy power; gold-for-oil trading; and Islamic Finance.
By Lars Schall
Hossein Askari, who was born in Iran and went to the UK at the
age of nine to receive his schooling, earned his Ph.D. in Economics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Since 1982 he has worked at
George Washington University, where he has served as Chairman of the
International Business Department and as Director of the Institute of Global
Management and Research and is now Iran Professor of International Business
and International Affairs.
Askari has written extensively on economic development in the Middle
East, international trade and finance, agri-business and oil economics,
including twenty books, six monographs and over one hundred refereed journal
articles. His latest book is “Conflicts and Wars: Their Fallout and
Prevention” (Palgrave Macmillan, July 2012) with another forthcoming entitled
“Collaborative Colonialism: The Political Economy of Oil in the Persian Gulf”
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). His opinion pieces have been published in the New
York Times, Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, The Christian
Science Monitor, US News and World Report, Foreign Policy and in other
newspapers and websites. Moreover, he is a regular contributor to Asia Times
Online.
Lars Schall: Professor Askari, are “resource wars” just a phenomenon of
modern times or isn’t that something that we see more or less at work
throughout history?
Hossein Askari: Historically, resources have been the fuel of colonialism.
The colonialist-imperialist powers were after resources from around the
world, as they are today. What is different today is that the colonialists
are collaborating with despots around the world to get what they want. They
support these despots to stay in power. The despots and their cronies enrich
themselves. And the colonialist powers get what they want–resources, exports
of arms to these countries with their companies and influential officials
profiting in the process. All of this at the expense of the citizens of the
exploited countries. This is what I call collaborative colonialism in
my forthcoming book.
L.S.: To have the control of energy flows is extremely crucial in our
time. Which conflicts do you see as “resource wars” that are connected to
energy?
H.A.: To my mind, US support of oppressive dictators in the Middle East
and Africa are an integral part of the resource wars. China is now stepping
in in a big way around the world. I think that the US is very shortsighted.
The Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf, will blow up. The only question
is when? Instead, the US should use tough love and help these despots to
change as the only way forward–fundamental political, social and economic
reforms. There is no other way.
L.S.: Is the control over the supply of energy resources for the
economy ultimately the predominant factor for the whole social life?
H.A.: Yes, energy is crucial for modern life but I don’t think that it
will be oil that matters in 50 or so years. We will need cleaner
fuels–natural gas and renewables.
L.S.: I think that an expression of the importance of energy is
manifest in the traditional relations between international banks and the
major oil companies. Why is it that they seem to have been in a symbiotic
relationship with each other for more than a hundred years? To be honest, to
me it looks kind of incestuous the way that these oil and financial
relationships are all intertwined.
H.A.: Access to finance has been traditionally important in the oil and
energy business. Some of these energy projects require massive financing in
production and transportation (pipelines and tankers). In the 1940-1970
period, Middle East rulers borrowed from Western institutions to finance
their lifestyles and keep their countries afloat. In more recent times, the
rich rulers of the Middle East have also parked their ill-gotten gains in
Western financial institution.
L.S.: Now that we talk about banking and finance, let us raise the
topic of how monetary policies have an impact on oil prices. Can you explain
to us the connection, please?
H.A.: To my mind, the main drivers of oil prices have been global GDP
growth and supply disruptions. So by affecting economic growth, monetary
policy definitely impacts oil prices. Moreover, given that oil is priced in
dollars, a depreciation of the dollar will lead to adjustment in oil prices
in dollars and in other currencies.
L.S.: What are the main drivers for the current oil price? Why is it so
high?
H.A.: Besides the basic forces of supply and demand, a number of other
factors have also been proposed as important price determinants:
(i) The role of monetary policy (particularly that of the U.S. Federal
Reserve), as the central bank prints more money, the demand for goods rises.
Knowing that money is depreciating at a fast rate, consumers and producers
become speculators and develop high inflationary expectations. Producers
withhold commodities in order to take advantage of higher prices around the
corner, while consumers rush to buy and store commodities in anticipation of
price increases. In the case of oil, though, the ability of producers to
withhold supplies and consumers to hoard is somewhat constrained. For
producers, high storage costs, potential loss of long-term clients, and
damage to oil fields in the event of shutdowns all pose potential problems in
saving oil for a higher future price. For consumers to hoard oil, they incur
a significant storage cost and near-impossible logistical challenges.
(ii) The role of speculation, as speculation in the futures markets could
increase price volatility, but not long-term prices. If a speculator buys an
oil-futures contract, the purchase adds to the demand for oil. But if the
speculator does not take delivery and sells back the futures contract before
maturity, then there is no net addition to demand.
(iii) The value of the U.S. dollar (impacted, by the aforementioned
Federal Reserve policymaking), as it reduces the real price of a barrel of
oil for producers. But the currency is simply the unit of account; although
prices are quoted in dollars, in the end it makes no real difference how oil
is priced—dollars, euros, pounds, or yens (domestically, of course, the price
of oil may go up or down and by differing amounts in differing currencies
because of exchange range movements.) Oil is a global commodity, with prices
roughly the same the world over after accounting for any differences due to
transportation cost and taxes. If oil priced in dollars suddenly becomes
slightly less expensive due to exchange rate fluctuations, the demand
stemming from London or Tokyo will rapidly restore the price to equilibrium
levels. In short, it is difficult to establish a direct one-to-one causal
relationship between the value of the dollar and oil prices.
The most recent (dollar) price peak was in large part driven by a rapidly
growing world economy, a depreciating dollar, and especially confrontation
with Iran and conflicts in the Middle East, especially Iraq. While the price
of oil, like that of any other commodity, is driven by supply and demand, it
would appear that conflicts and upheavals leading to sudden supply
disruptions have played the most significant role in the wide price (in real
terms) gyrations during 2001-2011. No major spike exists without a
corresponding conflict, and vice-versa.
L.S.: Is there an oil price above which you would say it becomes
extremely difficult for the economy bear it?
H.A.: I don’t believe that there are any such red lines in economics.
Higher oil prices have some positive effects (for those in the oil business)
and largely negative macroeconomic effects. But these are discrete effects.
Also, the impact would be very different if oil prices rise gradually to a
“very high” level as opposed to rising to the same very high level overnight.
We have clearly adapted to the longest period of high oil prices ($80-$100)
without too much problem. Could we have done the same if oil prices were in
the $100-$120 range? Probably say. What if in the range of $150-$200? I don’t
know. What if in the range of $300-$400? I think that then the pain might be
unbearable.
Please also remember that all these prices are assumed in 2013 dollars
because if oil prices took a dramatic jump, global inflation would increase,
and real oil prices would in turn decline.
L.S.: How important are the option markets for the pricing of oil?
H.A.: I think that the option market is important to the extent that it is
another indicator of oil prices–namely, you can deduce the implied price from
options– and it is helpful in completing the market and affording
arbitrageurs, hedgers and speculators an important vehicle for pursing their
business.
L.S.: A huge factor in the energy market is the United
States of America. Do you believe that the shale oil and gas boom will lead
to energy independence for the U.S.? And what do you think about the report
that was released at the end of last year by the International Energy Agency
(IEA) that said that the United States will soon become the biggest oil
producer in the world?
H.A.: For the last 3-4 years I have said that shale oil and especially gas
will transform the global energy industry. The reasons are simple: Shale gas
will be found in abundance around the world (not just in the US), the sources
of this gas is more diverse and closer to the market, Shale oil deposits in
north America in my view parallel conventional oil deposits of the Persian
Gulf (yes, they are more costly to produce) and are economically competitive
at prevailing oil prices.
As to US oil production, let me start out by saying that the US is already
a big producer of oil. I believe that it is third, after Russia and Saudi
Arabia. But the US is also a big importer of crude oil. So yes, with more
reliance on gas and higher shale oil output, the US will import less oil but
will it become the largest producer, yes maybe (and by the way not a big
exporter ever in the foreseeable future).
I think that the IEA Report is an excellent document. I agree with all of
its broad predictions but the details and the exact timing of developments
could prove to be somewhat different.
L.S.: What kind of impact would this have on the relations of the U.S. towards
the Middle East?
H.A.: I think that the US footprint in the Middle East will decline more
rapidly because of these developments. It will be imperative for oppressive
rulers in the Persian Gulf to embrace fundamental political and economic
reforms now while they have time and more financial leeway. If they don’t,
they will be deep trouble with conflicts and uprisings that could mirror
Syria as the US has increasingly less interest in shedding blood and treasure
to support them. In short, I believe that the US will slowly, but surely,
lose interest in the Persian Gulf and its problems. And this may encourage
more protests in the region but also it will take the cork out of the bottle
and enable more comprehensive reforms in the region.
L.S.: Let’s turn to Iran. You believe that the Iranian regime is not
Islamic at all. Why do you think so?
H.A.: Let me correct you, I don’t think that any of the Muslim countries
of the Middle East are Islamic. The Islam of the Quran and of the life of the
Prophet Mohammad has some important political, social and economic
principles.
First, The Unity of Creation is of paramount importance.
To kill (torture, imprison, etc.) one innocent person is akin to killing
(torturing, imprisoning, etc.) all humankind.
Second, God gave the world the environment and natural
resources to humankind in TRUST to share equitably today and WITH all future
generations. Oil does not belong to rulers! It belongs equally to all
citizens. It must be managed in such a way that all future generations
receive similar benefits. Now, let’s be serious. Do these rulers live like
their average citizens? No, they are living lavishly at the expense of this
and future generations.
Third, rulers are supposed to be selected by their
communities. Tell me which ruler is freely selected? Rulers are expected to
seek advice and criticism. Tell me which ruler even tolerates criticisms? The
Prophet Mohammad is reputed to have lived modestly and said that rulers
should live as their poorest citizens so that they would experience poverty
and eradicate it.
Fourth, and possibly most important, at the core of an
Islamic society there must be social and economic justice. Corruption is
absolutely admonished. Tell me which of these countries is just? To me New
Zealand, Sweden, Norway, Finland and the like practice Islamic doctrines more
than do these Middle East Muslim countries.
If these countries really practiced the Islam of the Quran and the life of
the Prophet Mohammad, the rulers would acknowledge that the oil and gas reserves
belonged to the citizens of this and future generations. It would be managed
so. And the rulers would have no special access to these revenues. Surely
rulers could not object to this? And surely the US could persuade its
oppressive rulers to behave so!
I could write a book about this. But I will stop here. Enough said.
L.S.: Okay, but if the Iranian regime is indeed not Islamic but is
perceived as such, isn’t then something very wrong right from the beginning
in international relations vis-à-vis Iran?
H.A.: Again, I believe that the term “Islamist” is the most misused label
today. It is used by all to justify what they want. Those that are today
generally labeled as Islamist profess Islam but do not practice the Islam of
the Quran and of the Prophet. They are largely terrorists that use Islam for
their own ends. The West uses the term Islamist to label its enemies who are
Muslims but ironically who don’t follow the Quran. Despotic rulers also use
the label to frighten the West and get support for their dictatorial rule. It
is a very unfortunate state of affairs. The world is being divided along
false religious lines.
L.S.: Is the problem with Iran really about the nuclear program, or
isn’t that more or less a narrative for complete dis-informed idiots that
don’t have any clue of the facts? (1)
H.A.: No, the regime is the problem for the West and Israel. Under the
Shah, they were happy to see Iran get heavy and light water reactors. But not
now. The West wants a regime change.
From the Iranian perspective, I believe that the clerics and Iranians do
not feel safe with heavily armed Arabs in the Persian Gulf, US forces all
around and with the memories of the Iran-Iraq War –the US and the rest of the
West supplying Iraq with internationally outlawed chemical weapons. Do you
really expect the Iranians to trust what the West professes? Iran wants
security. The nuclear program is the only way. This is the price of Western
duplicity. I am sure that no matter what Iran says and signs, they will want
to master the nuclear fuel cycle to be a month away from having the bomb if
needed. Frankly, I would if I were in their place and after what they have
gone through.
L.S.: In the past you were optimistic that a collapse of Iran’s
currency, the rial, would lead to regime change. Do you still think so?
H.A.: I have always said that it is tough to get the policy changes you
want from sanctions, especially if they are not multilateral.
First, and foremost, it must be a policy that the people of the country
also want changed. That is not the case here. Iranians want the country to
master the fuel cycle and be like Japan, that is one month away from making a
bomb if needed.
Second, sanctions must cause direct pain on regime insiders (in this case
on the Revolutionary Guards and on business backers of the regime) or so much
pain on the general public that they protest. That is not yet the case here.
Sadly, innocent people are suffering and the sanctions are not causing enough
pain on regime insiders.
L.S.: Can you explain to us the way Iran is conducting its oil business
under the sanctions?
H.A.: Iranians have been clever with getting around sanctions. In the past
banks used the Iranian central bank and foreign central banks. Now they get
paid in gold. They do barter deals, they go through third countries to import
what they need. They give discounts on their oil. All this effectively
reduces the purchasing power of their oil exports.
L.S.: I would like to ask about another motive to put Iran into the
corner, which has to do with an oil price above or around $80 per barrel. I
think the Gulf states have an interest in keeping oil prices high enough in
order to balance their own budgets at a time of increased social spending and
other measures that are used to isolate these regimes from the effects of the
Arab Spring. These regimes need crude oil prices of about $ 80 per barrel to
keep their finances in order. Which in turn means that Saudi Arabia and
others have an interest in keeping Iran in the corner; that way Iran cannot
attract foreign companies to rebuild the infrastructure of its oil and gas
fields and expand it. On the other hand if the current sanctions would be
lifted and energy companies could operate freely in Iran, then its oil and
gas production would boom, which would increase the total supply — and
consequently the world price would fall. Is this totally out of touch with
reality?
H.A.: Let me first respond by agreeing with you that other Persian Gulf
countries (not so much the very high per capita rich countries of Qatar, the
UAE and Kuwait), especially Saudi Arabia, need an $80 price for a barrel of
oil. In the six GCC countries, the unwritten contract is simple. We, the
rulers, rule and we provide you with decent material comforts. We, the
rulers, take what we want and support you. This Saudi Arabia had a hard time
doing in the period 1983-2000. It is a contract and policy that is not
sustainable for a number of reasons. Government expenditures will eventually
exceed oil revenues. People will eventually resent the lavish lifestyles of
corrupt rulers and their cronies in comparison to their own. And eventually
people will want political and personal freedoms even if materially
satisfied, but especially if inequities and economic hardships.
L.S.: What is OPEC thinking about the 40 year plus debasement
of the dollar in general and how are they defending themselves?
H.A.: In my opinion, OPEC countries do not think of the long run. They are
focused on the near term and for that all that matters is sufficient revenues
and a few years ahead. Moreover, and I must truly emphasize, these are all
corrupt and ineffectively managed countries. None of them have even a
reasonable institutional base, let alone a solid institutional base (that
incorporated the rule of law, effective regulations, supervision and
enforcement, rational economic policy formulation etc.) that is the
foundation of sustained economic growth and prosperity.
L.S.: Has OPEC fears that the money parked in US treasuries (as part of
the petrodollar recycling) might one day be wiped out? What would happen to
the OPEC dollars being recycled if the banking system implodes? Are the
Middle Eastern OPEC countries diversifying fast enough to escape the disaster
that the Chinese are trying to escape from?
H.A.: Only a few OPEC countries have significant foreign assets–Qatar, the
UAE (Abu Dhabi), Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. And of these, all have diversified
except Saudi Arabia.
But as important is the fact that in all of these four countries, with the
exception of Kuwait, the rulers behave as if these investments were in the
first place theirs and they were sharing it with the general citizenry.
L.S.: Has anyone within OPEC ever thought about it that the White Man
might have considered this all along: we get the oil, we give paper money,
they park it with us, and some day when it becomes opportune we will
eradicate the financial holdings on some dodgy pretext?
H.A.: I think that they used to in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But not
since. The rulers want to stay in power and they need Western backing. This
is first and foremost in their minds.
L.S.: Do you believe – like I do – that the time will come when
oil-producing countries and other natural resource exporters will no longer
sell their commodities for paper money like in the past but predominantly for
hard assets such as precious metals – which would equal in my view “value
gets exchanged for value”? And aren’t there actually signs for it? (2)
H.A.: Maybe, but only if they become independent countries with elected
rulers, answerable governments and the rule of law. They have too much
invested in the dollar to abandon it. Also, only a few of the exporters will
continue to have current account surpluses and making it less important to
have a currency or a commodity that maintains its purchasing power over time;
because they will be spending it as they receive it.
The only signs of it are that all countries, not just oil exporters, have
diversified their foreign exchange reserves into gold, and Iran because of
sanctions is getting gold for some of its oil exports.
L.S.: But would you say it would make sense in general?
H.A: It only makes sense if an exporter has a continuing current account
surplus and if it is managing its net foreign assets to finance its
expenditures in the future and if gold is one asset in its diversified
portfolio. It still does not need to get paid in gold because it can always
turn around and immediately buy gold with its dollars and euros.
L.S.: What do you think about the fact that the oil-to-gold ratio has
been remarkable stable for a long period? James G. Rickards for example told
me once: “Of course the price of oil has moved between $30 per barrel and
$150 per barrel, and the price of gold has moved between $200 an ounce and
$1,500 an ounce, but if you look at the ratio, it always hovers around that
15-1 or 16-1 ratio, and that tells you something about the real intrinsic
value of commodities.” (3) Take a look at this chart of the gold-oil ratio,
please:
Your take?
H.A.: I believe that things tend to revert some sort of equilibria that
change gradually with the passage of time, but no hard and fast rules. It may
be in the range of 15-1 to 16-1 ratio but these ratios change with time and
are not hard and fast. The ratio depends on long-term supply and demand
developments.
L.S.: What do you think about the renaissance of gold in finance and
banking in general? What does this tell you?
H.A.: Investors believe that central banks will do whatever to keep the
party going.
L.S.: Since we were talking about oil prices, let’s talk about a
related problem, let’s talk about Peak Oil. You say that Peak Oil is neither
already upon us, nor will it be anytime soon. Why?
H.A.: As I said before, shale gas (and conventional gas) will be
increasingly substituted for oil. Shale oil output will increase rapidly. I
believe that Iraqi reserves will in time exceed that of Saudi Arabia. And if
the Persian Gulf enjoys a number of years of peace, the countries could
increase conventional oil output significantly above where it is today. So I
see global oil output could increase significantly as needed, although at a
higher price.
L.S.: So you think that the expanding world demand for crude oil can be
matched in the next, say, twenty to thirty years?
H.A.: Absolutely.
L.S.: The country of which it is said that it has the most untapped oil
reserves in the world is Iraq. Why is it that still very small portions of
Iraqi oil reaches the global markets?
H.A.: I agree with your expectations but the problem is Iraq’s continuing
political problems, its instability and the regional turmoil. I expect that
the Shia-Sunni chasm to widen in Iraq and more broadly in the region
(Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Iran- Arab) and to become more explosive unless
the West comes to its senses and does all it can to promote reconciliation.
If the region was stable, peaceful and with democratically elected
governments, I am sure that foreign investment in the oil industry could
become massive with a significant increase in the region’s oil and gas
output.
L.S.: Is it any surprise to you that Chinese energy companies have a
good standing in Iraq nowadays?
H.A.: Not at all. I believe not only in Iraq but this will become the case
in Iran, too. And if China can close the deal with these two populous
countries (with the US reducing its footprint in the region), it will become
the oil power of the future.
L.S.: However, China is vulnerable when it comes to the transportation
of the oil from that region. Don’t you think the US Navy has a say in that
matter of China becoming the oil power of the future?
H.A.: Not really. China is quickly becoming the only Superpower on a par
with the US (economically and militarily). If the US navy was to take any
such action against Chinese interest, It would be akin to an act of war. I
don’t believe that the US would interfere with the transportation of oil
aboard Chinese vessels.
L.S.: A major problem related to oil is that most OPEC countries began
in the 1980’s to exaggerate their reserves. What’s your opinion on this still
persisting problem?
H.A.: I don’t think they are exaggerated today. I believe that there is
much more oil in Iraq than currently estimated and also offshore in the
waters of the Persian Gulf.
L.S.: How would you characterize the relations between Saudi Arabia and
China on the one hand and the relations between Saudi Arabia and the United
States on the other? In general, you think that the U.S.-Saudi alliance will
end in tragedy for Washington. (4) Why so?
H.A.: China has been treading carefully in the region. It has not thrown
its lot with Iran and Iraq for one very simple reason. It is not yet
convinced that these two countries will be stable and prosperous in the near
to medium term– to honor what they sign, to buy goods from China, etc. It
still sees Saudi Arabia as the region’s oil giant because of the turmoil in
Iraq and bad management in Iran.
I am absolutely sure that the US-Saudi deal that was cemented after WWII
will end in tragedy unless the Al-Sauds and the US see the light. Let me
explain.
The Saudi economic system is not sustainable. The Al-Sauds will not have
enough revenues to afford subsidies for the general citizenry, without a
thriving private sector, and with their massive military expenditures and
revenues that they take for themselves.
A turnaround in Saudi Arabia will require massive political reforms (a
deliberate transition towards a constitutional monarchy) and economic reforms
(effective institutions, especially the rule of law, good regulatory,
supervisory and enforcement policies, reduction of corruption, rational
economic policies, etc.) that underly a thriving private sector that could
deliver good paying jobs.
The Al-Sauds will not reform as long as the US will support them. It’s
simple – the lust for power, control and human greed.
The US only reacts when it has no other options.
So the Al-Sauds and the US will go on as they have in the past. But
eventually demostrations and armed conflict will come about. By then it will
be too late!
L.S.: You’re an expert on Islamic finance. What are the merits of
Islamic finance / banking? Is there true Islamic finance existing today?
H.A.: Islamic finance is all about risk sharing (equity and asset based)
as opposed to risk shifting (debt based). It is thus a system that is
naturally more stable.
Islamic banking is 100 percent reserve banking. This means banks have two
functions. They keep deposits as cash, that is safekeeping. And they act as a
mutual fund, that is they invest the money that people ask them to invest in
assets of a particular risk class. They thus take no risk. Thus banks cannot
become insolvent and panics and financial crises are avoided. Essentially
such a system was proposed or endorsed by some of America’s greatest
economists, including Irving Fisher and Milton Friedman, under what became to
be known as the Chicago Plan. Recently, it has been also proposed under the
heading of “limited purpose banking” by Professor Kotlikoff. But the
financial industry and bankers don’t like such a system as it reduces their
take.
No country in the world has an Islamic system. The country that is trying
to move in that direction is Malaysia.
L.S.: What can (or maybe even should) the West learn from Islamic
finance?
H.A.: The system as described above, at least for a banking system, is to
my mind essential for restoring stability to our banking system. I don’t know
how else it could be done as easily.
L.S.: Thank you very much for taking your time, Professor Askari!
H.A.: Thank you for having me.
For two and a half years Professor Askari served on the Executive Board
of the International Monetary Fund and was Special Adviser to the Minister of
Finance of Saudi Arabia; in this capacity he frequently spoke for Saudi
Arabia at the IMF Executive Board. During 1990-1991 he was asked by the
governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia to act as an intermediary to restore
diplomatic relations; and in 1992 he was asked by the Emir of Kuwait to
mediate with Iran.
He has advised ministers of finance, heads of central banks, oil
ministers and other officials in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, he has been a
consultant to a number of multinational institutions and corporations,
including: the OECD, the World Bank, the United Nations, the Gulf Cooperation
Council, the Ministry of Finance of Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Planning of
Saudi Arabia, The US General Accounting Office, Bechtel, 1st National Bank of
Chicago, Sunoco and ARCO International.
Sources:
(1) See for example Christian Stork: “The
Complete Idiot’s Guide to Iran and the Bomb, Or: How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love the Facts”, published at WhoWhatWhy.com on September 27,
2012
under: http://whowhatwhy.com/2012/09/27/the-complete-idiots-guide-to-iran-and-the-bomb-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-facts/,
Christian Stork: “Iran Disinfo Watch: The AP Gets Thrown Another Curveball”,
published at WhoWhatWhy on December 4, 2012
under: http://whowhatwhy.com/2012/12/04/iran-disinfo-watch-the-ap-gets-thrown-another-curveball/,
and Pepe Escobar: “War fever as seen from Iran”, published at Asia Times
Online on August 22, 2012
under: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NH22Ak06.html
(2) See for example Robert Fisk: “The demise
of the dollar”, published at The Independent on October 6, 2009
under: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/the-demise-of-the-dollar-1798175.html
(3) Lars Schall: “Germany should end the
secrecy and bring its gold home”, published at Gata.org on October 10, 2011
under: http://www.gata.org/node/10550
(4) See Hossein Askari: “Saudi Arabia Sells
Out Washington“, published at The National Interest on June 2, 2011
under: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/false-friends-the-gulf-5393