The current hegemonic
ambitions of the U.S. government go back to the heavy influence of
neoconservative thought that began to be expressed during the Clinton
administration. The neocons realized that the U.S. was the sole remaining
superpower and they aimed for the U.S. to achieve global hegemony with power
as a foundation. Hegemony requires a military component and the U.S.
government had it. What is more natural, thought the
neocons, than for the U.S. to build up its global hegemony with its military
power as a foundation?
Hegemony has other
essential components, however, since no state or hegemon ever rules entirely
by coercion or the threat of force, that path of control being far too costly
and causing far too much resistance among subjects. Hegemonists
require a degree of legitimation among large groups of people and among
states that come under their sway. That in turn requires acceptance or even
support among these peoples or states. This comes about by persuasion that
focuses on some ideologies that are acceptable to the subject parties.
Certain bases of acceptance must be present from some standpoints, be they
political, economic, racial, ethnic, religious, scientific, artistic,
ideological or whatever.
The neocon hegemonic
thrust found expression in Bush’s attack on Iraq and his anti-terror
campaign. Anti-terrorism became one of the legitimizing rallying points of
the drive for U.S. hegemony. That became one of the bases of acceptance. A
global war on terror was thought to provide an entry point by which U.S.
global leadership and dominance could be asserted and attained. This seemed
like an ideal way of gaining legitimacy. Whoever was not counted as for this
goal would be counted as against it and regarded as an obstacle or worse,
evil and pro-terrorist. Also, all sorts of crimes and activities of other
states and groups, even domestic ones, could easily be labeled as terrorist,
thereby widening the possibilities of using force.
In practice, this
anti-terror idea was mainly put into practice by combining it with the
superior military force of the U.S. The neocon emphasis was always on power
and its application, and neocons gave little thought to its use by the U.S.
ever leading to failure. Even today, they still think the same way. When
power seems to fail, they always call for even greater doses of power to be
applied. In their hearts, they do not really understand that hegemony cannot
rely solely on force.
But when power was
applied in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, success eluded the neocons and the U.S.
government. Wars dragged on or forces thought to be defeated regained
strength or new forces emerged. The U.S. did not gain acceptance and a basis
for hegemony among the native populations based on anti-terrorism because
they did not broadly buy into the anti-terror story. They didn’t see
themselves as being rescued by U.S. forces. They may or may not have been
experiencing oppression to various degrees, but they didn’t welcome U.S.
forces with open arms as their liberators. Terrorism was not a problem for
Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya or Syria prior to the interference of the U.S.
Therefore it could not serve as a rallying point for their peoples. Rather,
these peoples viewed the U.S. military forces as uninvited intruders or
occupiers. There was no way that the U.S. could realize its hegemonic
ambitions in these places by reference to an ideology of anti-terror. The
most that such an ideology could achieve was to persuade the American public
of the justice of the aggressions of the U.S. government. This was useful to
the government but miles apart from the neocon goal of hegemony over foreign
nations. Furthermore, as the costs of these aggressions came to be realized,
they would tend to undermine the support of the American masses.
The neocons, Bush and
Obama had a second ideological basis in their attempts to bring foreign
peoples into their fold by their acceptance and not by brute force. That
appeal was that they would free these peoples from their governments, whom
the U.S. regarded as dictatorial, and they’d bring them liberty. They’d bring
them rights of many kinds. They’d help institute new systems of voting and
government. Women wouldn’t have to accept an inferior status. Whatever
perceptions of injustice, real or imagined, that neocons believed existed in
these countries, democracy would alleviate the problems. They’d bring
democracy. Democracy, like anti-terror, was and still is an important
rallying cry to make American interference acceptable to the broad masses of
people in these lands and others. And perhaps accompanying that cry is the
promise of greater economic prosperity by more greatly integrating these
economies into the world economy or the West’s financial and trading system.
The rhetoric of spreading democracy and rights also served the dual purpose
of holding on to the acceptance of these wars among the American media and
masses, just as the anti-terror appeal did. Americans like the idea of
liberation, of liberating oppressed peoples.
Put into practice, this
democracy appeal fell completely to pieces in country after country as
religious, tribal and ethnic divisions came to the fore after the U.S.
military succeeded in deposing the old governments. In every country exposed
directly to U.S. forces or to the U.S. arming and training of native forces
(Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria), no stable democracy, no nationwide
democracy, and no democratic peace have emerged. Deadly contests and
rivalries for power remain.
Although democracy seemed
to neocons like a reasonable basis for acceptance of U.S. hegemony, it failed
on several grounds. The neocons failed to understand the societies that they
were invading and/or undermining. They didn’t understand their laws, ways and
their divisions. It was thought that bringing down the existing governments
would suffice. However, these societies had no core group of democrats
that could persuade everyone to form a new democratic state and live happily
ever after. The U.S. invasions encouraged terrorists and terrorism, both
directly and indirectly. The U.S. military played off one group against
another. The region was infused with new and more sophisticated weapons. The
direct attacks by U.S. forces encouraged armed resistance from many among the
native populations.
As the anti-terror strain
of thought failed to support the hegemonic ambitions of neocon/U.S.
government thought, so did the pro-democracy concept. The most basic and
heartfelt reliance of neocon thought was on power (“shock and awe”) as
expressed by the U.S. military. It was not on the soft power without which no
government can sustain its power to govern. That soft power depends on the
acceptance by native populations. They have to think that what the government
is doing is by and large sensible in order to support it, even if their
notions of what is sensible are distorted or mistaken. If the American
interlopers could not generate that acceptance directly by their own edicts
and measures or indirectly through new puppet governors and intermediaries,
then the hegemonic missions would fail.
Hegemony must have some
grounds for acceptance among those governed by the hegemon. At times, the
U.S. has failed so badly that it has resorted to paying tribesman directly.
It has created a temporary economic inducement in both Iraq and Afghanistan
by this means. This showed that it had failed to find other grounds. At other
times, its failure was signaled by so-called surges in which it had to
re-introduce more troops to control the situation. Failing to generate
non-coercive means of gaining acceptance, the U.S. substituted coercive
means.
This is what is happening
again in Iraq regarding the Islamic State. The neocon Republicans argue that
Obama drew down American forces in Iraq too quickly and now must send them
back in. But even if Obama had kept those forces there, their continued
presence would still have signified a failure of hegemonic ambitions to have
found a non-coercive basis, as their re-introduction against IS also
signifies.
We may say that Bush’s
failures to achieve his neocon ambitions rest on poor understanding of the
societies invaded, naive expectations concerning democracy, an excessive
reliance on military force, an exaggerated belief that foreign peoples would
benefit from an American presence and grasp it with open arms, an
oversimplified understanding of the difficulties of creating a new and viable
state, a lack of understanding of the behavior of American armed forces in
their relations with native populations, and various tactical blunders all
along the way. In terms of creating and sustaining hegemony over new lands,
he and the neocons relied far too heavily on military means, believing that
American superpower status would win the day. He and the neocons failed to
understand that extending hegemony requires a great deal of soft power and
they had developed no firm grounds for gaining the acceptance of native
peoples. Anti-terror and democracy didn’t suffice.
Ukraine and Russia
provide the most recent examples of neocon policy, as effectuated by Obama.
The thinking shown in this case goes back to the presidencies of Clinton and
Bush.
The neocon goal, the
hegemonic goal, was advanced enormously with the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. All the U.S. had to do was bring the new Russian Federation into the
western orbit and it would have been well on its way to opening Russia fully
to western capital and western influences. This project was entirely
feasible. Russia had its share of democrats among its elite and still does;
this embraces its major leaders, including Putin. It had numerous and
important economic relations with European countries and still does. The
masses did not share these democratic aspirations as fully as its government,
but neither were they rebellious. Medvedev is the most western-oriented
leader. Putin has consistently reached westwards to Europe, but he also pays
more attention to mass sentiment and thus is more sensitive to the status of
Russia as an independent and unique power. He reaches toward the west
economically but he won’t kowtow and he appeals to certain cultural and
religious senses of his public.
Instead of reaching out
to the new Russia and the new Russian leaders, the U.S. and the EU decided to
bring the eastern European nations into the EU and into NATO. This was
despite the fact that a gradual and peaceful entry of Russia into western
ways was possible. Greater integration with the West was possible and was
occurring despite NATO’s expansion.
It is really a separate
story to understand how NATO succeeded in expanding its role. This was pushed
under several aggressive leaders, to the point where NATO has prosecuted
warfare in Afghanistan, Libya and the old Yugoslavia. The current
secretary-general Rasmussen continues this tradition vigorously and he is
exceedingly vocal in demonizing Putin and Russia in order to build up NATO
and its role further. His militarism is matched only by the U.S. neocon
senators and their media propagandists. The NATO expansion could not have
occurred without U.S. support. The U.S. wants NATO belligerence toward
Russia. This tends to drive Europe toward the U.S. and away from Russia.
It is a misreading of
Putin to see him as wanting to invade eastern European countries or rebuild a
USSR. Putin is being demonized intentionally by some such as Rasmussen. This
demonization rejects the attempt to achieve the western hegemonic goal by
means of soft power. Putin’s demonization most clearly serves the purpose of
NATO and of militaristic neocon thinking.
The attempt by the U.S.
to take Ukraine into the western and NATO orbit has pushed Russia further
away from integration with Europe through the resulting sanctions. The
policies of Clinton and Bush that separated Russia from the West have now
been taken further into economic relations. This is contrary to the ambition
of bringing Russia into a western embrace, which is where it seemed that
important Russians wanted to take it.
Why did the U.S. not
cultivate peaceful relations with Russia by ending NATO? That would have
meant accepting a significant degree of independence of Russia. Russian interests
in the Middle East conflicted with those of the U.S. Of greater importance,
it would have meant allowing Russian influence on Europe to grow. It would
have meant a reduced influence of the U.S. in Europe. The U.S. prefers to
keep Europe in its orbit and to consolidate its control over eastern Europe,
using a militaristic NATO as a tool. It prefers at times such as now to deal
with Russia as a hostile power, raising European hostility to Russia and
keeping Europe allied to the U.S.
Having rejected the easy
path to a soft hegemony over Russia, via economic investments, trade and
joint projects, U.S. leaders now think that some form of western political
hegemony over Russia can be achieved by means of sanctions. This will not
work. Putin won’t give in. Would any American president give in under similar
conditions? Furthermore, the Russian masses are no more amenable to U.S.
pressures than Arabs have been.
U.S. leaders perhaps hope
to create a color revolution in Russia or a putsch that deposes Putin. These
possibilities are unlikely, and if they did occur the consequences would be
very uncertain, as they have been in Ukraine and elsewhere. The U.S. can’t
count on achieving its hegemonic aims by policies or events that create major
uncertainties.
The last three U.S.
presidents had some degree of ambition to achieve some degree of hegemony
regarding Russia, but all three rejected the easy path of cooperation. They
led the U.S. into pursuing a more and more belligerent, antagonistic and sabre-rattling path toward Russia that has little or no
chance of bringing it into the western fold.
Successive
administrations seemed to have feared that an independent and
business-oriented Russia that forged strong economic relations with Europe
would undermine the position of the U.S. in Europe. American hegemonic
ambitions have run into a Russian wall where they can go no further. The U.S.
cannot succeed militarily against Russia and it cannot find grounds that
appeal to the Russian masses. It’s no accident that Obama has pivoted toward
the Pacific and the Orient, but there it is running right up against a
Chinese wall and Chinese fighter jets. Add Chinese submarines to the mix. In
this region too, the U.S. has become more belligerent.
The hegemonic ambitions
of the U.S., dashed in the Middle East, are growing in Africa. In eastern
Europe and the Pacific, they are devolving into defensiveness against other
great powers. American belligerence is looking more and more like a sign of
American weakness and frustration.
