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Basherbusters.com
explains what is naked short selling.
(emphasis mine) [my
comment]
What is Naked Short Selling?
Naked
short selling (naked shorting) refers to the practice of selling a stock
short without first either Borrowing the shares or Making an
"affirmative determination" that the shares can be borrowed.
In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued
"Regulation SHO" in an effort to curb abusive naked shorting. Many
other countries and trading markets have developed similar regulations.
The Problem
Short selling is a bet that a stock price will decline. A short seller
borrows stock and then sells it, hoping to buy back the same amount of stock
later, at a lower price, for return to the lender. Short selling is legal.
Naked short selling involves selling stock without first borrowing (or
sometimes even locating) the stock [naked short selling = selling imaginary
stocks (with the assumption of borrowing stock later to make it real)]. If a
naked short seller does not borrow the stock he sold, he will be unable to
deliver that stock to the buyer to close the transaction. This is called a
“failure to deliver” (FTD) [When a brokerage “fails to
deliver”, the imaginary stock ends up staying imaginary, possibly for
years]. Naked short selling is generally illegal, though market makers
are allowed to temporarily naked short for the sake of bona fide market
making. FTDs are always illegal when delivery failure exceeds 13 days.
Exchanges do not disclose whether short sales are naked and supply no
information on FTDs. Even worse, in transactions where shares are not
delivered, brokerages issue stock IOUs called “share entitlements [This
is a nightmare waiting to happen].” Retail customers’ account
statements do not distinguish between real shares and share entitlements. [brokerages
are adding counterparty risks to their clients stock purchases without their
knowledge. This is fraud.]
FTDs create phantom shares that circulate in the system as real shares.
Just as counterfeit currency dilutes and destroys value, phantom shares
deflate share prices by flooding the market with false supply.
Some short sellers use naked shorting and oversupply of phantom shares to
manipulate stock prices downward. Because regulations are loose and
enforcement lax, they are unafraid of failing to deliver.
Customers holding phantom shares can, and often do, re-sell those phantom
shares as if they were real. Subsequent purchasers do not receive real
shares; instead they receive only share entitlements. Phantom shares sold by
naked short sellers are thus laundered in the market by subsequent
transactions in which share entitlements come to resemble (but cannot become)
real shares of stock.
FTDs
threaten market integrity in at least three ways
The corporate voting system is undermined by chronic over-voting. The
circulation of FTDs leads to more ownership than there are shares to own. As
a result, brokers and transfer agents routinely mail out and receive back
more proxy votes than there are shares to vote. [As actual
data is unavailable, this massive over-voting is the best evidence/proof that
naked short selling problem.]
Companies and shareholder value are destroyed
Market integrity is threatened. Large brokerage firms and hedge funds often
use leverage to build naked short positions, a strategy that poses systemic
risk to financial markets.
What little is publicly known about FTDs is available as a result of
Regulation SHO, implemented by the SEC in January, 2005, in order to curb
abusive naked short selling and reduce FTDs. Regulation SHO requires
exchanges (e.g., NYSE and NASDAQ) to publish daily a list of firms with FTDs
above a calculated threshold. That list is known as the Regulation SHO
Threshold List.
Since Regulation SHO was enacted two years ago, 4,512 companies have appeared
on the Threshold List. According to a recent Office of Economic Analysis
report, 6,223 securities have graduated from the Threshold List, meaning
thousands of companies have been on the Threshold List more than once. Curiously,
Regulation SHO only reports victim companies; there is no disclosure of
either the amount of FTDs or of the institutions who fail to deliver. The size
of past (but not current) FTDs can only be obtained through petition to the
SEC’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) office.
Neither the SEC nor the exchanges will disclose the names of the
institutions failing to deliver, even through FOIA petition, as “fails
statistics of individual firms…is proprietary information and may
reflect firms’ trading strategies.” [These “trading
strategies” involve blatant fraud. Therefore releasing “fails
statistics of individual firms” would obvious affect these
“trading strategies”]
The SEC’s prediction
that firms could not remain on the Threshold List longer than 13 days was
false:
Total # of Days
or More on the Threshold List
|
# of Companies
|
13
|
2735
|
25
|
1735
|
50
|
938
|
100
|
376
|
200
|
83
|
300
|
24
|
500
|
2
|
FOIA
data reveals
significant FTDs as a percentage of average volume in select exchanges and
issuers:
Exchange
|
Peak FTD's
|
Peak Date
|
Average Volume
|
FTD's as a % of
Average Volume
|
NYSE
|
172,707,364
|
01/31/2006
|
1,701,643,478
|
10%
|
NASDAQ, OTCBB
and Pink Sheets
|
1,337,784,073
|
03/13/2006
|
15,455,938,738
|
9%
|
Issuer
|
Peak FTD's
|
Peak Date
|
Average Volume
|
FTD's as a % of
Average Volume
|
Total Days on
Threshold List
|
Cal-maine (CALM)
|
2,498,529
|
01/10/2005
|
430,102
|
581%
|
192
|
Global Crossing
(GLBC)
|
2,387,641
|
01/21/2005
|
660,604
|
361%
|
383
|
Global Links
(GLLC)
|
27,287,714
|
02/04/2005
|
28,865,952
|
95%
|
141
|
iMergent (IIG)
|
289,054
|
05/02/2005
|
303,852
|
95%
|
252
|
Inhibitex (INHX)
|
3,129,627
|
04/07/2006
|
20,738
|
15,091%
|
27
|
Krispy Kreme
(KKD)
|
4,652,372
|
03/28/2005
|
4,359,081
|
107%
|
474
|
Netflix (NFLX)
|
4,959,482
|
01/03/2005
|
2,578,794
|
192%
|
362
|
Novastar
Financial Inc (NFI)
|
3,223,846
|
11/10/2004
|
409,272
|
788%
|
453
|
Vonage (VG)
|
5,662,925
|
05/30/2006
|
1,681,333
|
337%
|
42
|
Regulation
SHO “grandfathered” FTDs older than January 2005 and new FTDs
prior to an issuer’s appearance on the Threshold List, thus pardoning
sales for which money was paid but no stock delivered. [Since FTDs older than
January 2005 have been “grandfathered”, they are excluded from
all the data disclosed by Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC)]
While publicly downplaying the issue, the SEC has quietly admitted to
adopting the grandfather clause because of concern about “creating
volatility where there were large pre-existing open positions.” [As
with gold (and other commodities), brokerages have over the years slowly
build up a massive short position in the US stock market. Making them unwind
these short positions would cause the US financial system to collapse.]
Scholars have shown that many FTDs are strategic—that is, used to
manipulate prices.
Large U.S. brokerages collectively own and operate the Depository Trust
and Clearing Corporation (DTCC). The DTCC operates with little SEC oversight
and consistently denies the existence of a systemic problem while
simultaneously fighting public disclosure of even minimal FTD data.
What little data the DTCC does disclose is misleading. For example, the
DTCC claims failed trades sum to $6 billion daily, or 1.5% of the dollar
volume.
The true magnitude of FTDs is obscured by Continuous Net Settlement (CNS),
which nets failures against shares held by brokers. The DTCC asserts that CNS
has “eliminated the need to settle 96% of total obligations.”
If the DTCC processes $400 billion in trades daily as claimed, then $384
billion are netted out and only $16 billion require delivery. Thus, the $6
billion in FTDs that exist on any given day is 37.5% of the trades that
require delivery—twenty-five times the 1.5% reported by the DTCC.
The statistics above ignore “ex-clearing”—that is,
trades cleared directly by brokers bypassing the DTCC. Some scholars believe
that “fails occurring through ex-clearing may elude the [reporting]
requirements of Regulation SHO.” FTDs in ex-clearing may be four times
as great as quantities discussed above. The DTCC’s Stock Borrow Program
(SBP) adds additional mystery to the situation.
My
reaction: Regulators have allowed US brokerages to turned the
stock market into a Ponzi scheme.
1) Brokerages are allowed to sell imaginary stocks to investors, with the
assumption of replacing them with real shares later.
2) When brokerages “fail to deliver” and replace imaginary shares
with real ones, these brokerages issue stock IOUs called "share
entitlements.”
3) Exchanges do not disclose whether short sales are naked and supply no
information on FTDs.
4) Retail customers' account statements do not distinguish between real
shares and share entitlements.
5) Share entitlements created by FTDs circulate in the system as real shares,
flooding the market with false supply. Companies and shareholder value are
destroyed.
6) Large US brokerages collectively own and operate the Depository Trust and
Clearing Corporation (DTCC). The DTCC is the primary vehicle for enabling
naked short selling.
7) What little information available about FTDs comes from the DTCC, and
these discloses are misleading:
A) FTDs older than January 2005 have been "grandfathered" and are
excluded from DTCC disclosures.
B) Continuous Net Settlement (CNS), which nets failures against shares held
by brokers and obscures the true magnitude of FTDs.
C) DTCC statistics ignore "ex-clearing” data (trades cleared
directly by brokers bypassing the DTCC).
D) The DTCC's Stock Borrow Program (SBP), which allows brokers to borrow
nonexistent shares, reducing FTDs.
8) Widespread, chronic over-voting offers the most telling evidence of the
“stock IOUs” floating around the financial system.
Conclusion: While
I am disgusted that brokerages use naked short selling to manipulate the
stock market, it is not what worries me about naked short selling. The two
issues I have with naked short selling are:
1) “Share entitlements” creates a counterparty risk that
investors are completely oblivious to. For example, lets an investor named
Jon is worried about the dollar collapse, and, to protect himself he buys
$500,000 of gold mining stocks through JPMorgan. Jon relaxes, thinking his
investment in gold stocks will protect him from a currency collapses. However,
when the dollar does collapse, JPMorgan goes under, and Jon finds out he
actually owns 500,000 of “share entitlements” to gold mining
stocks, not the stocks themselves. This makes him a general creditor in
JPMorgan’s bankruptcy. Months later, after much litigation, Jon is able
to recover $100,000 of his initially investment. Unfortunately for Jon, the
dollar has already lost so much money that this 100,000 won’t even buy
a pack of gum.
While this is an extreme example, it illustrates how naked short selling has
added counterparty risks to owning stocks.
2) Brokerages are selling billions, if not trillions, of imaginary assets.
These imaginary stocks sales (and associated fees) are responsible for a
large portion of the financial “profits” used to justify huge
banker bonuses. The proceeds from these imaginary stocks sales also help pay
these huge bonuses or any other purpose these institutions see fit. This is
simply ridiculous: the sale of imaginary assets can't be the basis of a
viable financial system.
Brokerages are supposed to be middle men for their clients. When investors
turn over cash for the purchase of a stock, brokerages are supposed to use
this money to secure the actual share. Instead of doing so, brokerages are
putting “stock IOUs” into their clients account instead. This is
even worse than the deposit reclassification scheme banks
use with their client’s checking account.
Final note: See why I like physical gold now? In a financial system
overflowing with “imaginary shares” and “stock IOUs”,
owning any asset via a brokerage firm, even a regular stock share, has
counterparty risks.
Eric de Carbonnel
Market Skeptics
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