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At some point,
governments will probably have to give up the extend-and-pretend and instead
actually try to solve the problems they are faced with. Then, ideally, they
will take a few steps to make sure these problems don't happen again in the
future.
A constant problem with banking systems in general is their
"systemic" nature. The failure of a bank, or a series of large
banks, causes problems far beyond the bank itself. For example, if a
corporation has $10m in a bank account, and that bank goes bust, then the
corporation might be unable to make debt payments or pay its employees. This
could cause the corporation to go bust even if it was in fine financial
condition.
Before the 1930s, banks were largely unregulated. As hundreds went bust in
the 1930s, a series of new regulations were imposed to prevent
"systemic" issues from recurring. One of these was deposit
insurance, for small savers. In those days, the only "savings"
option open for many individuals was bank savings accounts. They didn't have
money market funds (a 1970s innovation). Stock market "trusts" had
a tendency to be rather risky, and often used leverage. (As a result of huge
losses in leveraged trusts, mutual funds were required henceforth to use no
leverage.)
Among these innovations was the Glass-Steagall
separation between commercial banks and investment
banks/broker-dealers/merchant banks etc. It was, I would say, one of the very
few examples of an almost perfect piece of regulation, which accomplished its
goals while introducing few meaningful new problems.
Wikipedia on Glass-Steagall
The idea was: we didn't want a commercial depository bank, insured by the
FDIC (created by Glass-Steagall), to be subject to
losses coming from investment bank shenanigans such as derivatives and so
forth. The idea was to make the "systemic" part of the financial
system, the commercial depository banks, relatively safe. The risky,
unregulated bits would be shunted off to the "investment banks," which
could go bust and be liquidated without much "systemic"
consequences. Glass-Steagall was effectively
repealed in 1999, and we've seen the explosion of financial nonsense that has
taken place since then.
The reason for the repeal of Glass-Steagall was to
create greater profits for bankers. Where do profits for bankers come from?
It is basically a function of leverage combined with the spread
or return on assets. Even in the case of complex financial games as played by
the investment banks, this is more or less the case.
March 23, 2008: How Banks Work 7:
the Lender of Last Resort
March 16, 2008:
How Banks Work 6: Liquidy Crises and Bank Runs
March 9, 2008:
How Banks Work 5: Selling Loans
February 24, 2008: How Banks Work
4: Banks and the Economy
February 17, 2008: How Banks Work
3: More Elephant Poop
February 10,
2008: How Banks Work 2: Shitting Like an Elephant
February 3, 2008:
How Banks Work
To generalize, I would say that the extra profits from the repeal of Glass-Steagall came about because investment banks were able to
use the commerical banks' balance sheet, because
they had been combined into one. How does this work? Remember that the
commercial banks were "depository institutions," which meant that
they had relatively cheap funding from depositors, in no small part because
of the government guarantee. Also, they were considered "too big to
fail," more or less, so they would be rescued in the event of disaster,
as indeed turned out to be the case. So, the banks' non-deposit funding, i.e.
bank debt, also could be issued relatively cheaply. Thus, the cheap
funding led to a greater spread and higher return, not only
on plain-vanilla commercial and consumer lending, but also the whamma-jamma investment bank stuff going on. Remember,
investment banks under Glass-Steagall had been
segregated as the risky, disaster-prone part of the industry. So, their
funding (debt) would normally carry a higher interest rate.
The second part of the equation is leverage. Although commercial banks
generally adhered to various captial ratios that
were supposed to limit leverage (although even they weren't all that
restrictive), when they added on their investment banking operations, and
also various off-balance-sheet liabilities which became popular, in effect
they were taking waaaay more risk with their
capital base, which in effect means more leverage.
The result was systemic kerflooey, exactly what
Glass-Steagall had been designed to prevent.
As you might expect, this makes me a fan of Glass-Steagall.
But could it be improved? After all that has happened, since 1933 and
especially in the last few years, you'd think we could do an even better job
today.
I thus propose "Super Glass Steagall."
What would it contain?
1)
Commercial, depository banks are once again segregated from "investment
banks." This means no derivatives dealing, securities issuance, and so forth.
Nothing on the asset side except loans and publicly-traded bonds. Nothing on
the liabilities side except for deposits, straight debt, and maybe some
preferred equity. No off-balance-sheet liabilities, SIVs, and other such
nonsense. Capital ratios apply. Accounts below $250,000 are insured by the
FDIC, as is the case today. Commercial deposits are not insured, but are
senior to bank debt. Derivatives can be used, but only in bona-fide hedging
of existing, on-balance sheet assets (i.e. loans).
Here's the new bit: at least 30% of the bank's liabilities must consist of
bank debt, not deposits. Next, this debt falls under government regulation so
that it can be converted to equity at any time, according to the judgement of the banking regulator. In effect, a "prepack bankruptcy" under regulator
oversight is built into the debt from issuance. (Because it is written into
the debt from the start, it would not actually be a "bankruptcy."
"Bankruptcy" refers to the failure to perform on obligations.)
Lastly, all other financial obligations and existing equity are junior to the
bank debt, so they are rendered worthless in the event of a debt conversion.
This would also be "written into the contract" from the beginning,
such that a regulator-led debt conversion/recapitalization won't cause a
"failure to perform."
This would make bank recapitalization very easy. You just "press the
button," and the bank's debt would magically convert to equity, thus
recapitalizing the bank with no legal hassles. Since this bank debt carries
the risk of regulator equity conversion, they would probably have a somewhat
higher yield. The regulator could also opt for a partial conversion if that
seemed best, for example converting half of the bank debt to equity and
leaving the remainer as debt.
October 12, 2008: Effective Bank
Recapitalization 2: Three Examples
2) Investment banks/broker-dealers are free to live and die on their
own. Their own funding (debt) would reflect the risk of failure, and carry a
higher interest rate, as it should. Capital limits should apply, however.
3) However, there should be a third class of financial institution,
which is in effect a securities depository institution. This is a prime
broker (for institutional accounts), and also custodial brokers such as
Ameritrade and other such companies used by individuals. Bankruptcy of an
investment bank also carries "systemic" risk for those who use
these institutions for custody, which is practically everyone today.
Custodial arrangement should be separated from IB/BD balance sheets. For
example, when Lehman Brothers went kerflooey,
anyone using Lehman as a prime broker ended up in bankruptcy court hoping
that they would receive their securities from the bankruptcy judge. I bet
that was a lot of fun.
Gibbons: When a Prime Broker
Fails: Critical Issues from Fund Managers in the Lehman Bankruptcy
Close to 100 hedge funds used Lehman as their prime broker and
relied largely on the firm for financing. In an attempt to meet their own
credit needs, Lehman Brothers International routinely re-hypothecated[30] the
assets of their hedge funds clients that utilized their prime brokerage
services. Lehman Brothers International held close to 40 billion dollars of
clients assets when it filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. Of this, 22 billion
had been re-hypothecated.[31] As administrators took charge of the London business and
the U.S. holding company filed for bankruptcy, positions held by those hedge
funds at Lehman were frozen. As a result the hedge funds are being forced to
de-lever and sit on large cash balances inhibiting chances at further growth.[32]
This in turn created further market dislocation and over all systemic risk,
resulting in a 737 billion dollar decline in collateral outstanding in the
securities lending market.[33]
Wikipedia on the Lehman Bankruptcy
These custodial/depository brokerages can offer brokerage servcies
for customers, but should be banned from holding any securities that are not
owned by their customers. In other words, no dealing, no proprietary trading,
no HFT, etc. etc. Also, they would engage in no other investment banking
operations, such as securities issuance, derivatives dealing, etc. In effect,
they would become a lot like existing execution brokerages for retail
accounts, like Ameritrade or Interactive Brokers. First, this segregation
removes the risk of IB/BD implosion from affecting the status of securities
holders. Second, as order-takers and also custodians, these companies have
information that could easily be used (and in fact is used every day) to
trade against their clients, in the form of front-running and also various
strategies designed to force liquidation of holdings, causing customer
losses. These custodian/broker companies should have some limits to leverage,
which in this case would be mostly margin leverage. Investors can use more
leverage if they like, but it should be through some external institution,
not the custodian itself. IB/BDs can still take customer orders, but would be
banned from a prime brokerage/custodian role.
So, what does the financial system look like after this? First, you have the
commercial, depository banks, the most "systemic" part. These are
safe, safe, safe, because they don't have investment banks to get them into
trouble, they don't have off-balance sheet liabilities, derivatives and other
hidden leverage, and if they get into trouble, there is an instant "fix
the problem" option for regulators by way of the debt/equity conversion.
Second, you have the securities custodian/broker, which is also rather safe.
It has limited leverage (margin lending), and has no operations besides
holding securities and taking trade execution orders. Safe, safe, safe.
Lastly, you have all the risky bits put into the IB/BDs such as Goldman
Sachs. What would they do? They would have their various dealing operations,
derivatives (maybe derivatives should be shunted into their own corporate
structure), securities issuance and investment banking. What would happen if
an institution like this went bust? First, their lenders would take a loss,
but they should have known what they were in for. This would have no systemic
effects. Anyone using them as a derivatives
counterparty would take a loss, but that is also part of the game from the
get-go, with little systemic consequences. Lastly, their investment
banking/securities issuance operations would cease, but there are many, many
companies offering these services, so any compnay
that needed to raise capital could go to another firm. In fact. the very same people in the failed firm would soon show up
in another firm, so in effect all that would change is the name on the
business cards. In other words, these sorts of companies could go bust with
no particular consequences.
Most people today are drooling morons when it comes to understanding how
currencies work, and basic economic management. However, they are very good
at this sort of legal/regulatory stuff. So, I would say that it is fairly
likely that some sort of solution like this could be implemented, at least by
the more enlightened governments.
Nathan Lewis
Nathan Lewis was formerly the chief international economist
of a leading economic forecasting firm. He now works in asset management.
Lewis has written for the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal Asia, the
Japan Times, Pravda, and other publications. He has appeared on financial
television in the United States, Japan, and the Middle East. About the Book:
Gold: The Once and Future Money (Wiley, 2007, ISBN: 978-0-470-04766-8,
$27.95) is available at bookstores nationwide, from all major online
booksellers, and direct from the publisher at www.wileyfinance.com or
800-225-5945. In Canada, call 800-567-4797.
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