This article notes that the technical situation for the gold price has
sharply improved, to the evident surprise of many mainstream analysts. It
discusses possible reasons behind the turnaround, and implications for the
future
The technical situation is shown in the chart below.
A "golden cross", with the 55 day moving average crossing above
the 200 day moving average with both of them on a rising trend, and the share
price above both these moving averages, has now occurred. This is generally
taken by traders to indicate the bear trend has reversed, and a bull market
is now in place.
More interestingly, this change of direction is combined with a bullish
pennant pattern, which commenced on 11th February and completed on 3rd March,
taking precisely three weeks. This is shown by the dotted lines. The intraday
price movements (not shown) conform exactly to the pattern, and the break-out
on 4th March saw high volume with an increase to a record amount of outstanding
Comex contracts.
The other technical qualifications for a pennant are also fully satisfied.
It follows a sharp rise, is a consolidation lasting no more than three or at
most four weeks, volume diminished while the pattern played out (taking Comex
volumes as proxy), and the break-out was a resumption of the trend. It
therefore appears to be a text-book example.
Pennants give us a price objective, which equates to the preceding rise
from its breakout point. This yields a minimum price target of approximately
$1400, which with pennants can happen quite quickly. And that helps explain,
from a purely technical point of view, the seemingly unstoppable strength in
the gold price.
Fundamentals
Technical analysis is the justification for investors to consider and take
action in capital markets, without having to understand the underlying
reasons why prices change. Indeed, in these days of seemingly infinite
quantities of bank credit being applied to financial speculation, price
trends are being driven day-to-day by charts, making prices dependent on the
application of credit rather than fundamental appraisals of prospective
values.
Technical analysis is notoriously fallible, encouraging action independent
from rational thought. We are told that flows into gold ETFs have been
positive for the last forty days. But if we ask the question, whether or not
the buyers of physical gold represented by paper entitlements are doing so
for financial protection, or alternatively are energised by the hope of
rising prices, one must conclude that it is most probably the latter.
Put another way, technical analysis is justified on the basis that by
encouraging the madness of crowds, it works, and there is plenty of loose
money slopping around the markets to ensure it might. This really is not good
enough. A reasoned understanding of what gold actually is, an appreciation of
vested interests, and an analysis of the practical consequences of investment
flows, is vital for us as individuals if we are not to be whipsawed in volatile
markets.
The gold price started 2016 with all the big investment firms bullish of
the dollar and bearish of commodities and gold. It is from such extremes in
sentiment that sharp reversals take place: it's a case of everyone having
sold all for dollars and there being no material sellers left to sell. If
this is all that's involved this time, the previous trends for a rising
dollar and therefore a falling gold price could well resume when these
positions are sufficiently unwound.
To establish whether or not this is the case we must turn to fundamentals,
which requires us to discard the conventional analytical approach. We must
stop thinking gold is rising, when what is actually happening is that the
dollar is falling. Nearly all economists and market traders have it back to
front. Gold has no variable fundamentals, the condition that qualifies it
uniquely as sound money. It is the currency it is measured in that has all
the variable fundamentals, and that is where we must look.
When we look at the dollar price of gold, we naturally think that it is
gold that is moving. But we are comparing two forms of money, gold that is
not in general circulation, against the dollar that has supplanted it. And
given that it is the dollar that is issued in any quantity desired by both
the US Government and through fluctuations of bank credit, it is the dollar
which ultimately depends on the market's assessment. The constant in this
comparison for anything other than short-term trend-chasing is simply gold.
Economists who argue otherwise are slaves to macroeconomic fashion rather
than rational price theory.
Understanding that measured in gold it is the price of the dollar falling
makes sense of what is happening. It points us to the dollar's fundamentals,
not so much against other currencies that share many of the dollar's
characteristics, but against commodities. And in Table 1 we can see that the
dollar's purchasing power has been falling against other key commodities as
well against gold.
Table 1. Selected commodities: fall in US$'s purchasing power
The turnaround in the dollar's fortunes has been sudden, taking less than
three months. The US dollar has been excessively overbought, predictably
followed by a subsequent fall in its purchasing power against many key
commodities. And there are good reasons for it to fall even further. They
centre on the damage being inflicted on the dollar's position as the world's
reserve currency. China and Russia are leading the charge to do away with the
dollar, and China in particular is deliberately promoting the yuan as the
dollar's substitute for international settlements with all her trading
partners. The dollar's role in pricing commodities is becoming an anomaly,
because China does more international trade than America by far.
That helps explain the long-term prospects for the dollar, which has yet
to discount a reduction of the quantity of dollars in international
circulation. Unless it is balanced by a contraction of credit on the American
banks' balance sheets, a reduction in offshore dollars will inevitably result
in the dollar's purchasing power tending to fall. But there is also renewed
demand for commodities to add to the mix, coming from China.
China is about to embark on a colossal programme of infrastructure
spending. Not only will this fill out many of the deficiencies in China's
domestic infrastructure, but it is also earmarked for a vast course of
industrialisation involving the whole of Asia. Cynics are sure to be correct
in decrying the wasteful inefficiencies of state spending of this sort, but
they are missing the point.
The point is that China has told us she values the dollar less than she
does the commodities required to satisfy her thirteenth five-year plan, and
the ones that will follow. This plan commenced with the Chinese new year, so
she will already be looking to swap most of her stockpile of dollars for
stockpiles of the required raw materials. Last year, China carefully laid
down the groundwork for this action.
It was vital for China to control the risks to her own currency that would
arise from the planned disposal of the majority of her dollar reserves. This
was always her primary motivation for lobbying the IMF to include the yuan in
the SDR, and also for her recently declared policy of managing it against a
trade-weighted basket of currencies. So long as the yuan is measured against
the dollar alone, it is an invitation for foreign speculators to attack it
against their preferred unit of account. Attacking a currency where foreign
exchange policy is more widely defined introduces great uncertainty into a
speculative trade. The change in foreign exchange policy simply gives China
the cover to sell her overvalued dollars for undervalued commodities.
China's actions are likely to lead to a major shift in macroeconomic
expectations over the coming months. With the dollar's purchasing power
continuing to fall relative to energy and industrial commodities, China's
commodity suppliers will find the burden of their dollar-denominated debt
relative to their output rapidly swinging in their favour. Gone, or at least
deferred, will be the nightmare of commodity-related debts undermining the
global financial system. There will, of course, still be bad debts, such as
in the US shale-oil industry, and also problems for some resource-rich
countries, such as Brazil, where the financial damage has already been
considerable and may be ongoing. But for western investors, their current
preference for safety in low, or even negative-yielding government debt, will
be replaced by the opportunities offered in recovering emerging markets.
Standing back from the day-to-day introspection of western capital
markets, it has been interesting to watch this financial train-wreck begin to
materialise. Western central banks by debasing their currencies have produced
little more than financial ammunition for speculation on a grand scale. We
saw the effect of a flood of this accumulation into the dollar over the last
eighteen months, and we are about to see the opposite effect as it ebbs away.
And as speculative flows reverse, the dollar will increasingly be sold by
stale bulls in preference for commodities. Much of China's dollar stockpile,
along with increasingly redundant petrodollars from the Middle East, will
also be sold, putting further downward pressure on the dollar's purchasing
power.
A weakening dollar will become the next headache for the Fed, because the
fall in its purchasing power will feed into a revival of price inflation
without a pick-up in economic activity. Current market expectations of
negative interest rates will inevitably switch to an anticipation of rising
interest rate to contain the fall in the dollar's purchasing power. And as
the dollar's fall in purchasing power against commodities progresses, the
solvency of many domestic borrowers and even of the US government itself will
become an additional risk to the dollar.
While we can now see reasons emerging for the US dollar's future loss of
purchasing power, we can see the same conditions broadly affecting the other
major currencies. Like the dollar, these currencies are all valued on the
basis of their government promises, but it is not the purpose of this article
to compare their merits. Gold alone does not suffer the disadvantage of
having a government issuer, its above-ground stock increasing at an estimated
rate that is similar to global population growth. Gold is not required to
rise, as the term bull market suggests. Its purchasing power is likely to be
considerably more stable than that of paper currencies over the long term. We
do not have to make guesses over gold's future purchasing power.
Instead, the future price of gold depends on what happens to the
purchasing power of the paper currencies in which it is measured. No case
needs to be made for its usefulness or even its value, because it is the only
sound money there is, no more and no less than that.
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information provided in this article is provided solely as general market
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your use of or reliance on such information.</em></p>
The views and opinions expressed in the article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of GoldMoney, unless expressly
stated. Please note that neither GoldMoney nor any of its representatives
provide financial, legal, tax, investment or other advice. Such advice should
be sought form an independent regulated person or body who is suitably
qualified to do so. Any information provided in this article is provided
solely as general market commentary and does not constitute advice. GoldMoney
will not accept liability for any loss or damage, which may arise directly or
indirectly from your use of or reliance on such information.