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One of the implications that can be logically deduced from the
irrefutably true axiom of human action is that human action is purposeful
(or conscious) action — action that is directed at
attaining certain ends.
This insight is essential for fully understanding Mises's
reconstruction of economics as a formal-logical science (praxeology, as he
called it), and all the implications that can be deduced from it.
These implications include, for instance, that cause and effect
(causality) and time are categories of human action, that means are scarce
with respect to the ends that they could possibly serve, and that the
existence of human action implies uncertainty about the future course of
events.
However, the truth claim that human action is purposeful action may all
too easily invite criticism. For instance, couldn't one challenge Mises's insight by saying that many decisions people make
are not purposeful, but rest on arbitrariness, whim, or impulse?[1]
Rejecting the insight that human action is purposeful would call into
question the truth claims that can be derived from the axiom of human action.
This would open the door for methodological disorientation and, as a result,
false theories in the field of economics.
Given the importance of understanding the irrefutable truth that human
action is purposeful action, it is worthwhile to briefly remind ourselves how
Mises arrives at his insight, which he deduces from
the axiom of human action.
As noted earlier, the axiom of human action is irrefutably true.
It is a self-evident proposition whose truth-value cannot be denied. Any
attempt at denial would result in an insoluble intellectual contradiction,
because saying "Humans cannot act" is a form of human action.
Action is replacing "a more satisfactory state
of affairs for a less satisfactory," and man must make use of means to
attain ends. Means, in turn, are always scarce with regard to the attainment
of ends. If means were not scarce, they wouldn't be subject to economizing,
and so there couldn't be any action — and this is, of course,
impossible to believe.
It is in this sense that human action is purposeful action — that
is, making use of means for attaining certain ends. And praxeology remains
unconcerned about the content of certain ends or how concrete ends were
motivated.
Mises notes,
Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put
into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals,
is the ego's meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its
environment, is a person's conscious adjustment to the state of the universe
that determines his life. Such paraphrases may clarify the definition given
and prevent possible misinterpretations. But the definition itself is
adequate and does not need complement of commentary.
II.
At the same time, Mises states that not all
actions performed by humans qualify as purposeful actions. He explicitly
refers to nonpurposeful (or: unconscious)
action, namely "the reflexes and the involuntary responses of the body's
cells and nerves to stimuli."
Would Mises's reference to nonpurposeful
action allow the conclusion that there are humans who do not act as
implied by the axiom of human action? As will be shown below, the question
can be answered in the negative.
(1) To start with, it should be noted that the insight that human action
is purposeful action is not related to psychology. Whereas the latter
aims at explaining the workings of the inner (mental) events of a person and
the motives that lead to certain action, praxeology is strictly confined to
the logic of human action.
Praxeology, resting on the axiom of human action, derives from the
conclusion that human action is purposeful action — which stands in
sharp contrast to nonpurposeful action — by
means of formal logic. It does not take recourse to any kind of behavioral
assumptions.
(2) To Mises, examples of nonpurposeful
action are the workings of the body (the beating of the heart, breathing,
etc.) and reflexive, involuntary responses to stimuli (e.g., noise-related
flinching). Nonpurposeful action has, in Mises's understanding, the same status as external data:
it is part of the general conditions under which human action — the
purposeful action — takes place.
"Saying
'Humans cannot act' is a form of human action."
Mises writes,
The unconscious behavior of the bodily organs and cells is for the acting
ego no less a datum than any other fact of the external world. Acting man
must take into account all that goes on within his own body as well as other
data, e.g., the weather or the attitudes of his neighbors.
Insofar as these conditions are overcome by action (such as, for
instance, suppressing reflexes), human beings actually extend their scope of
purposeful action: "If a man abstains from controlling the involuntary
reaction of cells and nerve centers, although he would be in a position to do
so, his behavior is from our point of view purposeful."
(3) Is it possible to draw an exact line between purposeful and nonpurposeful action? A human fetus, a human asleep, or a
person under the influence of drugs may show action that seems — to an
observer — nonpurposeful rather than
purposeful.
However, the observer is in no position at all to come up with the
conclusion that a person is not acting purposefully, no matter how nonpurposeful, meaningless, or nonsensical a person's
action may appear to him. Even an insane person or a person under the
influence of drugs acts, and thereby aims at achieving certain ends.[2]
Mises writes,
People are sometimes prepared to believe that the boundaries between
conscious behavior and the involuntary reaction of the forces operating
within man's body are more or less indefinite. This is correct only as far as
it is sometimes not easy to establish whether concrete behavior is to be
considered voluntary or involuntary. But the distinction between
consciousness and unconsciousness is nonetheless sharp and can be clearly
determined.
(4) In a final step, it is worthwhile to highlight the consequences that
a denial of the truth claim that human action is purposeful action would
imply.
"The
knowledge that human action is purposeful action has nothing to do with
psychology."
Mises writes,
The denial of purposefulness in man's attitudes can be sustained only if
one assumes that the choosing both of ends and of means is merely apparent
and that human behavior is ultimately determined by physiological events
which can be fully described in the terminology of physics and chemistry.
Even the most fanatical champions of the "Unified Science" sect
shrink from unambiguously espousing this blunt formulation of their
fundamental thesis. There are good reasons for this reticence. So long as no
definite relation is discovered between ideas and physical or chemical events
of which they would occur as the regular sequel, the positivist thesis
remains an epistemological postulate derived not from scientifically
established experience but from a metaphysical world view.…
But it is evident that such a metaphysical proposition can in no way
invalidate the results of the discursive reasoning of the sciences of human
action. The positivists for emotional reasons do not like the conclusions
that acting man must necessarily draw from the teachings of economics. As
they are not in a position to find any flaw either in the reasoning of
economics or in the inferences derived from it, they resort to metaphysical
schemes in order to discredit the epistemological foundations and the
methodological approach of economics."
III.
To conclude, Mises showed that human action is
purposeful action: the purposeful attempt to remove a felt uneasiness or to
replace a less satisfactory state of affairs with one that is more satisfactory.
It logically follows from the axiom of human action.
The knowledge that human action is purposeful action has nothing to do
with psychology. Stating that human action is purposeful action does not take
recourse to assumptions about the actor's concrete motivation.
Nonpurposeful behavior is, as far as praxeology is concerned, to be
classified as external data, part of the general conditions under which human
action takes place. It is outside the scope of praxeology.
While a distinct line can be drawn between purposeful and nonpurposeful action at a conceptual level, such a
distinction cannot necessarily be detected by the outsider through
observation — but this does not invalidate the distinction drawn by Mises.
Human action is purposeful action. This knowledge is derived logically
from the irrefutably true axiom of human action, which is at the heart of
praxeology.
Thorsten Polleit
Notes
[1] In this
context see, for instance, V.L. Smith, "Reflections on Human Action after 50 Years," Cato Journal 19, no. 2, Fall
(1999): pp. 195–214, esp. p. 200. Here, Smith states "Mises has been overtaken by recent trends in
neuroscience."
[2] In the German
Nationalökonomie
(1940), Mises, in quite some detail, pointed out
that by taking recourse to the notion of "instinct" for explaining
human behavior one would not provide a "final explanation" in the
metaphysical sense. He wrote (p. 29): "Der Begriff
Instinkt ist keine Erklärung im metaphysischen Sinne, er ist
einfach die Bezeichnung eines Punktes, über den hinaus die Bemühungen unseres Denken nicht zu dringen wissen
oder zumindest bisher nicht zu dringen vermochten.
Die Einführung dieses Begriffes
ermöglicht es uns, für Erscheinungen, an die wir mit dem
Denkverfahren der mechanischen
Kausalität nicht heranzukommen vermögen,
das andere menschliche Denkverfahren, das, das wir für die Erfassung des menschlichen Handelns zur Verfügung haben, anzuwenden. Wie Bewegung und Bewusstsein ist auch Instinkt nur ein Ausdruck
für einen Grenzpunkt menschlichen Denkens, und nicht etwa ein Wort
zur Bezeichnung der Ursache oder gar der letzten Ursache."
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