Introduction
Most=20
analyses of the gold market consider the annual change in the =
amount of=20
gold produced by the mining industry to be an important =
determinant of the=20
gold price, with bulls regularly supporting their case by citing =
the=20
mining industry's inability to ramp up production and bears =
sometimes=20
claiming that increasing mine production will eventually weigh the =
gold=20
price down. Our contention, however, is that the annual supply of=20
newly-mined gold is so small relative to the existing aboveground =
supply=20
that changes in mine production should be ignored when assessing =
gold's=20
prospects.
We=20
warn you that the following discussion is quite lengthy (by our=20
standards), but we wanted to cover most aspects of this important =
topic --=20
important, that is, for anyone who genuinely wants to understand =
the gold=20
market -- in one hit.
The=20
aboveground gold supply (and why it makes sense to analyse gold as =
if it=20
were a currency)
The=20
gold that gets produced each year doesn't get consumed; rather, it =
gets=20
added to the existing aboveground stock. This means that the =
entire=20
aboveground stock represents potential gold supply. In this =
respect, gold=20
is more like a currency than a commodity.
Now,=20
we realise that not all the gold that was ever mined is currently =
in a=20
readily saleable form, but a substantial chunk of it is. To be =
more=20
specific, it has been roughly estimated that around 150,000 tonnes =
of gold=20
have been mined throughout history, about two-thirds of which has =
been=20
mined since 1945. Of this 150,000 tonnes, we estimate that around =
108,000=20
tonnes* are held for monetary/investment purposes. =
Monetary/investment=20
(MI) gold includes official gold holdings (the gold kept by =
central banks=20
and the IMF), privately-held bars and coins, the gold held by ETFs =
and=20
closed-end funds, and monetary jewellery (24-carat jewellery that =
is held=20
solely as an investment or a store of value). This 108,000-tonne =
figure=20
is, in our opinion, a rough but reasonable estimate of the MINIMUM =
amount=20
of gold in readily saleable form, and clearly dwarfs the 2,400 =
tonnes of=20
gold produced by the mining industry over the past =
year.
Analysing=20
the gold market as if new mine supply dominated the supply side of =
the=20
equation would be like analysing the dollar market as if the only =
dollars=20
that really mattered were the new dollars that came into existence =
over=20
the past year. The fact is that a new dollar created today will =
become an=20
indistinguishable part of a total supply that includes every =
dollar=20
created, but not yet extinguished/destroyed, up until today, and =
it is=20
this total supply, combined with the associated demand for this =
total=20
supply, that determines the dollar's price. Moreover, it could be =
argued=20
that the gold mined each year is less important to gold's =
supply-demand=20
balance than are the dollars created each year, because new dollar =
supply=20
typically constitutes a much greater percentage of the existing =
stock than=20
does newly-mined gold supply. Specifically, whereas the total =
aboveground=20
supply of saleable gold increases by about 2% every year, the =
total supply=20
of dollars sometimes increases at a double-digit rate and rarely =
increases=20
by less than 5%.
Putting=20
things into perspective
As=20
discussed above, the total supply of gold in readily saleable form =
is=20
probably at least 108,000 tonnes, which stands in stark contrast =
to the=20
current annual mine supply of around 2,400 tonnes. This suggests =
that=20
changes in investment demand (changes in the demand for the total=20
aboveground stock) are more than 40-times more important to gold's =
price=20
trend than changes in mine supply. To put it another way, a 0.25% =
(one=20
quarter of one percent) change in investment demand is more =
important than=20
a 10% change in mine supply.
Data=20
provided by the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) lend =
additional=20
support to the argument that changes in annual mine supply are =
tiny in=20
relation to the overall market. The LBMA reports that an average =
of around=20
20M ounces (650 tonnes) of physical gold changes hands on the =
London gold=20
market every day. This means that the equivalent of more than one =
year's=20
mine supply changes hands in the space of only four average =
trading days=20
on the London market. And London is not the world's only market =
for gold=20
bullion.
If=20
changes in mine supply are irrelevant, then what is=20
relevant?
Over=20
periods of 2 years or less, gold's price trend is usually =
determined by=20
the combination of the US dollar's exchange value, credit spreads, =
nominal=20
interest rates, inflation expectations, and the yield curve. =
However, the=20
long-term is the focal point as far as this discussion is=20
concerned.
Our=20
view is that long-term trends in the gold price are driven by =
changes in=20
the overall level of confidence in the monetary system and the =
economy, as=20
best indicated by the long-term trend of the broad stock market =
(note:=20
there is no reason why the stock market should be an indicator of =
monetary=20
confidence, except that since the 1930s governments have generally =
implemented policies that debase the currency and create =
uncertainty=20
whenever the economy weakens). We point out, for example, that the =
equity=20
bear market of 1966-1982 coincided with a bull market in gold and=20
gold-related investments (gold stocks); that the equity bull =
market of=20
1982-2000 coincided with a bear market in gold and gold-related=20
investments; and that the equity bear market that began in 2000 =
has, to=20
date, coincided with a bull market in gold and gold-related =
investments.=20
Correlation doesn't imply causation, but it makes sense that the =
world's=20
favourite repository of savings over the ultra-long-term would =
tend to=20
trend inversely to the more speculative investments.
An=20
implication of the above is that almost regardless of anything =
else,=20
gold's current bull market will continue until the current equity =
bear=20
market reaches its conclusion, which, based on historical =
evidence, won't=20
happen until after the average P/E ratio has dropped to single =
digits and=20
the average dividend yield has moved above 5%.
Wait=20
a minute: most other commodities also rallied during the 1970s, =
trended=20
lower during 1980-2001, and trended upward during much of the =
2000s. How,=20
then, does gold's strong tendency to move counter to long-term =
trends in=20
the broad stock market differentiate it from any other commodity? =
The=20
answer is contained in the following monthly chart of the gold/CRB =
ratio.
To=20
see the true picture it is often helpful to remove the US$ (or any =
other=20
fiat currency) from the equation by monitoring the performance of =
things=20
in terms of gold (the Dow/gold ratio being a popular example) or =
by=20
monitoring gold's performance in terms of other things. =
Specifically, to=20
find out what gold REALLY did during any period we can review how =
it=20
performed in terms of commodities in general (as represented by =
the CRB=20
Index). The following chart makes the point that the gold/CRB =
ratio has=20
moved counter to long-term trends in the broad stock market, =
meaning that=20
gold has out-performed most other commodities during long-term =
equity bear=20
markets and under-performed them during long-term equity bull=20
markets.
Gold's=20
performance relative to other commodities during the 1930s is also =
worth=20
mentioning. Whereas most commodities and commodity-related =
equities did=20
poorly during the massive equity bear market of 1929-1938, gold =
and gold=20
stocks fared extremely well.
Other=20
factors that affect, or are widely believed to affect, gold's =
price=20
trend
Although=20
our main purpose today is to deal with the ramifications (or lack =
thereof)=20
for the gold market of changes in gold production, we will take =
this=20
opportunity to also quickly deal with the effects of central bank =
gold=20
sales and changes in jewellery demand. In particular, we want to =
quickly=20
explain why the latter are irrelevant and why the former have some =
significance, but nowhere near as much as commonly =
believed.
The=20
effects of central bank (CB) gold sales
In=20
point form, here is a summary of the central-banking community's =
influence=20
on the gold market. Note that we place the gold held by the IMF =
and the=20
gold held by government treasury departments (in the US it is the=20
Treasury, not the Fed, that owns the gold reserve) under the=20
'central-banking umbrella'.
1.=20
CBs hold about 30% of the MI gold stock, so they have the ability =
to exert=20
influence over gold's short- and intermediate-term price trends. =
However,=20
their actual sales over the past 20 years have been too small to =
matter.=20
Specifically, the World Gold Council (WGC) reports that CBs =
reduced their=20
collective gold reserve at the rate of around 250-tonnes/year =
during the=20
1990s and 400-tonnes/year during the first 8 years of the current =
decade.=20
(By the way, this means that CBs reduced their gold holdings at a =
faster=20
rate during the current bull market than during the final decade =
of the=20
preceding bear market, which is consistent with our view that =
their sales=20
have not been a significant influence on the price =
trend.)
2.=20
News relating to CB gold sales often has a short-term effect, but =
does not=20
appear to have altered intermediate-term trends and cannot, in our =
opinion, alter long-term trends.
3.=20
CB gold sales represent reduced demand by some holders of the MI =
stock,=20
but these sales could actually cause an increase in overall MI =
demand.=20
This is because confidence in a fiat currency could fall if the =
gold=20
reserves 'backing' that currency were reduced, especially during a =
period=20
when confidence was already in a fragile state for other reasons.=20
Something along these lines occurred during the second half of the =
1970s,=20
when gold sales by the Fed (on behalf of the US Treasury) and the =
IMF were=20
quickly followed by increases in the gold price.
4.=20
CB monetary machinations (manipulations of interest rates, money =
supply,=20
and pretty much everything else to do with money and credit) are =
probably=20
of far greater importance to gold's long-term price trend than the =
gold=20
sales/purchases they happen to make from time to time.
The=20
effects of changes in jewellery demand
Many=20
gold market analysts attribute great importance to changes in =
jewellery=20
demand. For example, we occasionally read analyses where it is =
stated that=20
jewellery demand is something like 60% of total gold demand, but =
what they=20
really mean is that jewellery demand is 60% of the flow of new =
gold=20
(primarily mine supply, but also including scrap supply). In other =
words,=20
such analyses completely ignore the huge aboveground supply of =
gold and=20
the associated demand for the aboveground supply.
The=20
fact is that changes in annual jewellery demand are even less =
significant=20
than changes in mine supply, and should therefore be ignored when=20
assessing gold's prospects.
Anticipating=20
some objections
1.=20
An argument we've come across is that at any given time there may =
be few,=20
or perhaps even no, sellers of the existing aboveground gold =
supply,=20
resulting in the market being dominated by the regular selling of =
gold=20
miners (gold miners continually sell at whatever the market price =
happens=20
to be at the time the gold is removed from the =
ground).
Well,=20
we know from the LBMA statistics that the selling of gold miners =
is small=20
compared to the amount of physical gold that routinely trades via =
only the=20
London market. However, even if all current owners of gold decided =
to=20
'sit' on their investment in anticipation of higher prices the =
selling by=20
the gold mining industry wouldn't have an outsized, or even a =
meaningful,=20
effect on gold's price trend. The reason can best be explained by=20
considering the hypothetical example of Bill and Fred, two =
shareholders of=20
XYZ Corporation. Bill owns 70% of the outstanding XYZ shares and =
Fred owns=20
1% of the outstanding shares. In our example, Fred decides to sell =
his 1%=20
stake immediately while Bill plans to wait for a much higher price =
before=20
parting with any of his shares. Even though Fred is the one =
selling in the=20
present, Bill's decision to hold his shares off the market is =
vastly more=20
important, as far as the market's price discovery is concerned, =
than=20
Fred's decision to immediately sell. The reason, of course, is =
that Bill=20
controls 70-times more shares than Fred. Robert Blumen's article =
at http://mises.org/story/3593 goes =
more deeply=20
into this concept.
2.=20
It could be argued that industrial metals such as copper also have =
huge=20
aboveground supplies if we account for the metal 'stored' in =
buildings and=20
other structures. The difference is that this metal is not in =
saleable=20
form. For example, almost regardless of the copper price it will =
never be=20
economically feasible to tear down functional office and apartment =
buildings for the sole purpose of extracting the contained copper, =
meaning=20
that the copper wiring and plumbing built into these structures =
should not=20
be counted as part of the aboveground supply.
Gold=20
is the only commodity where the "stocks-to-flow" or =
"stocks-to-use" ratio=20
is so large that the "flow" component can be ignored. This point =
was=20
touched on in an article posted by Steve Matthews, a hedge fund =
commodity=20
strategist, at http://www.lbma.org.uk/docs/alchemist/alch32_commodity.pdf.=20
Mr. Matthews concludes: "It's fair to say that nothing else =
even comes=20
close to gold's 7,019 days [of remaining supply]. This leads us to =
a=20
proposition that I'm sure some of you have thought about before: =
the right=20
way to trade gold is as a foreign currency, not as a commodity. =
You would=20
need someone else to give you a trading recommendation; I abdicate =
my duty=20
to declare myself bullish or bearish flat price in the face of =
what I=20
consider overwhelming evidence that gold resides outside my =
supply/demand=20
analytical framework."
By=20
the way, we think the 7,019 days of remaining supply (the number =
of days=20
of supply in aboveground storage, assuming that there is no =
further=20
production and that non-investment demand proceeds at the current =
rate)=20
mentioned by Mr. Matthews greatly understates the true situation. =
Our=20
assessment is that the days of remaining supply in the gold market =
is at=20
least 13,000 (about 35 years). In comparison, the days of =
remaining supply=20
in the copper market is typically in the 30-90 range.
3.=20
There has been a loose inverse relationship between gold =
production and=20
gold's price trend over the past 40 years. To be more specific, =
the=20
following chart of world annual gold production shows a downturn =
during=20
the first half of the 1970s (a bullish period for gold), a steady =
upward=20
trend from the early-1980s through to around 2000 (a generally =
bearish=20
period for gold), and then a tapering off during the current bull =
market.=20
This has been interpreted as evidence that changes in mine supply =
do,=20
contrary to our analysis, have a material effect on the gold =
market.=20
However, such interpretations reveal the danger of blindly =
assuming that=20
correlation implies causation.
Given=20
the size of the overall gold market it is not reasonable to =
conclude that=20
the production trends illustrated by the following chart were =
important=20
influences on gold's price trend over the period in question. So =
how,=20
then, do we explain the apparent negative correlation between =
price and=20
production that has arisen over the past 4 decades?
The=20
most logical explanation is that there is, in fact, a cause-effect =
relationship between mine supply and price, but that price is the =
cause=20
and mine supply is the effect (a higher price leads to higher =
production,=20
etc.). Due to the extremely long delay between cause and effect, =
what we=20
get is the appearance that falling production pushes the price up =
and that=20
rising production pushes it down; but what is actually happening =
is that=20
today's production levels are a response to price changes that =
occurred at=20
least a decade earlier.
The=20
time delay is so long because it will generally take at least a =
few years=20
of higher gold-mining profit margins to stimulate an increase in=20
exploration activity, that will, after several more years, lead to =
an=20
increase in production; and it will generally take many years of =
low=20
gold-mining profit margins to prompt the gold mining industry to =
reduce=20
its production and exploration activity.
With=20
regard to the past few decades, our assessment is that rising =
costs=20
combined with a fixed gold price during the 1960s probably brought =
about=20
the decline in gold production during the first half of the 1970s, =
while=20
the large increase in gold-mining profit margins during the 1970s =
prompted=20
increased exploration activity that eventually led to more mines =
being=20
constructed and higher production during the 1980s.
With=20
gold-mining profit margins generally remaining robust and with =
many people=20
remaining convinced that gold's next bull market was just around =
the=20
corner, the industry continued its expansion throughout the 1980s. =
It=20
wasn't until the second half of the 1990s that the downward drift =
in=20
gold-mining profitability really began to take its toll, causing=20
exploration activity to all but cease. The result has been an =
essentially=20
flat production profile from the late 1990s through to the present =
day,=20
but note that the past 15 months' surge in the gold/CRB ratio (a =
proxy for=20
gold-mining profit margins) should lead to more aggressive =
exploration,=20
and, eventually, to higher gold production.
(Chart=20
data from USGS for all years prior to 2006 =
and from=20
the World Gold Council for 2006 onward)
Conclusion
Gold=20
market analyses -- such as those put together by Gold Fields =
Mineral=20
Services (GFMS) -- that treat new mine production as if it =
represented a=20
substantial chunk of the total gold supply, and/or that place =
great=20
importance on factors such as jewellery demand and scrap supply, =
are of no=20
use to anyone whose goal is to understand what drives the gold =
price. In=20
fact, such analyses are worse than useless because they create a =
false=20
impression. The reality is that the contribution to total gold =
supply made=20
by newly-mined gold is so small that changes in mine production =
should be=20
considered irrelevant when assessing gold's upside potential =
relative to=20
its downside risk.
*The=20
108,000-tonne figure is derived from the analysis presented by =
James Turk=20
in his 1993 booklet "Do Central Banks Control the Gold Market". In =
this=20
booklet Mr. Turk estimated that the amount of monetary/investment =
(MI)=20
gold was 72.7% of the total aboveground gold supply at the time =
(1993). To=20
arrive at the 108,000-tonne estimate for the current stock of MI =
gold, we=20
have assumed that the ratio of MI gold to total aboveground gold =
is the=20
same now as it was in 1993.
Steve=20
Saville
The Speculative=20
Investor
Tous les articles par Steve=20
Saville
Steve=20
Saville publie r=E9guli=E8rement des analyses et des pr=E9visions =
sur son site =E0=20
l=92adresse suivante : =20
www.speculative-investor.com.
Steve=20
Saville est contributeur =E0 24hGold.com. Les vues pr=E9sent=E9es =
sont les=20
siennes et peuvent =E9voluer sans qu=92il soit n=E9cessaire de =
faire une mise =E0=20
jour. Les =
articles=20
pr=E9sent=E9s ne constituent en rien une invitation =E0 r=E9aliser =
un quelconque=20
investissement. =
L=92auteur,=20
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